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LESSONS FROM THE PAST: THE VENETIAN
REPUBLIC’S TAILORING OF PATENT
PROTECTION TO THE CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE INVENTION
Stefania Fusco*
ABSTRACT—In recent years, much discussion in patent law has revolved
around granting tailored protection to provide better incentives to inventors
in different industries and to increase patent quality. For example, the
deliberations that led to the enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act (AIA) focused specifically on the role of the patent system in different
industries as well as on modifying remedies and patent terms to reflect the
needs of distinct technology sectors. Whereas in the literature there seems
to be substantial agreement on the fact that tailored protection would be
beneficial for the effectiveness of the patent system, there is no consensus
with respect to which entity should be vested with the authority to produce
tailored patent policies, standards, and rules based on the needs of the
various industries. Currently, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit and the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) are the two principal candidates for this role. Some of this debate
is connected to the broader issue in legal academia of granting general
regulatory authority to administrative agencies with highly specialized
knowledge. Contrary to other administrative agencies, such as the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), Congress has never granted such authority to the
USPTO; scholars have criticized this inconsistency. The strongest
argument that patent experts, such as Jonathan Masur and Sarah Tran, have
used to question the current status of the USPTO refers to the fact that
much could be gained from the information that this agency has
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accumulated through years of experience working with inventors in
different industries, particularly with respect to tailoring patent protection.
Historically, the Venetian Republic provided tailored patent protection
based on the characteristics of the invention. In that context, the entity
entrusted with the power to tailor the protection granted in each case was
the Senate, the issuing authority. Moreover, although the Venetian
Republic enacted what is widely recognized as the first Patent Act in the
world in 1474, the Venetian Senate continued its practice of granting
tailored patents until the end of the Republic in 1797. In fact, as explained
by Luigi Sordelli in 1974, following the enactment of the 1474 Act,
inventors could obtain protection in Venice in two ways: through the newly
created statutory system or through the much older customary system of
senatorial grants. Conclusive evidence that Sordelli’s view was correct is
provided in a separate paper that I co-authored with Ted Sichelman and
Toni Veneri, in which we shed important new light on the true origin of
patent law. In this article, I focus instead on tailoring patent protection.
Specifically, I use original documents from the Venetian State Archives to
present a detailed account of how the Venetian Republic used its
customary patent system to tailor protection to the unique characteristics
of an invention.
Furthermore, I provide a full analysis of what can be learned from the
Venetian experience to inform the modern debate on tailoring patent
protection. Until now, only two other legal scholars have conducted
extensive examinations of the original Venetian patents: Ted Sichelman
and Sean O’Connor. The Venetian patent system appears to have been a
very successful one; it operated for more than 300 years and during the
16th century helped Venice to transform itself from being a nation of
sailors to being a nation of artisans and engineers, and ultimately the center
of technological development in Europe. Thus, the Venetian customary
patent system offers important lessons on how tailored patent protection
and higher patent quality can be achieved. An accurate description of this
system is crucial to further understanding the specific steps that we should
take to reach these goals today.
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INTRODUCTION
Is the U.S. patent system providing the optimal level of protection to
all of the industries that it covers? At least in theory, patent law in the
United States provides uniform, technology-neutral protection to all kinds
of inventions.1 This is true, notwithstanding the fact that technology is
definitely not uniform.2 Consequently, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argued
in 2003 that there is no reason to believe that our current patent system is
performing optimally.3 In fact, according to Burk and Lemley, patent
protection should be tailored to the characteristics of the respective
industries.4 Prior to the work of Burk and Lemley, other scholars had
proposed a tailored patent system,5 but it was following their contribution
that the debate on this issue became substantial in the United States. While
there appears to be some consensus among patent scholars on the question
1

Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577 (2003).
Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1579.
5 See, e.g., Himanshu S. Amin, The Lack of Protection Afforded Software Under the Current
Intellectual Property Laws, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 19 (1995); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common
Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151
(1997); Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN L. REV. 1329
(1987); John C. Phillips, Sui Generis Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 997 (1992); Leo J. Raskind, The Uncertain Case for Special Legislative Protecting
Computer Software, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1131 (1986); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case
Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY
L.J. 1025 (1990).
2
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of whether tailored protection would be beneficial to enhancing the
effectiveness of the patent system, there is no agreement about how to
achieve this result and, in particular, about which entity should be vested
with the authority to produce tailored patent policies, standards and rules
based on the needs of the various industries.6 Burk and Lemley explained in
their paper that their preference would be for the courts to conduct the
tailoring activity in patent law.7 However, they concluded that this task
could also be assigned to other entities such as the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO).8 Ultimately, the two principal candidates for
this role in the literature currently seem to be the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the USPTO.9
Part of this debate is connected to the broader issue in legal academia
of granting general regulatory authority to administrative agencies with
highly specialized knowledge. Contrary to other administrative agencies,
such as the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA), Congress has never granted such
authority to the USPTO—an inconsistency often criticized by scholars.10
The strongest argument that patent experts, such as Jonathan Masur and
Sarah Tran, have used to condemn the current status of the USPTO refers
to the fact that much could be gained from the information that this agency
has accumulated through years of experience working with inventors in
different industries, particularly when it comes to tailoring patent
protection.11
In contrast, the Venetian government began providing tailored patent
protection at the beginning of the 15th century12 when the desire for new
technologies and methodologies of production in the Republic became
6 See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT. (2009) (arguing that the court should play a central role in patent policy); Burk & Lemley,
supra note 1 (arguing that the Federal Circuit is essential to patent policy); Jonathan S. Masur,
Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275 (2010) (arguing for a Congressional grant of substantive
rulemaking authority to the PTO as a central step toward more efficient patent policy); Sarah Tran,
Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487 (2012) (arguing that the USPTO
should play a central role in patent policy).
7 Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1630 (“We argue that the courts must embrace their role in
making the unitary patent system work for widely divergent industries.”).
8 Id. at 1696 (“In the case of patents, the PTO is an actor to consider, with what may be an expanding
role in shaping the application of the statute.”).
9 Id. at 1633 (“Scholars have variously argued that the Federal Circuit should defer to the PTO or
conversely that the PTO should defer to the Federal Circuit.”).
10 See Masur, supra note 6.
11 Id. at 304-11.
12 Ted Sichelman & Sean O’Connor, Patents as Promoters of Competition: The Guild Origins of
Patent Law in the Venetian Republic, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1267, 1271 (2012).
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noteworthy.13 In fact, the appetite for new knowledge at that time likely
have prompted the Venetian government to grant privileges to those
artisans and inventors—foreigners, in particular—who were willing to
bring their expertise to Venice.14 Ultimately, an elaborate system of
protection for inventions was created, and the first patent act in the world
was enacted in 1474 (the “1474 Act”).15
After the introduction of the 1474 Act, as explained by Luigi Sordelli
in 1974, the Venetian Republic had two systems of patent protection:
statutory and customary.16 For the purpose of studying the tailoring of
patent protection, the Venetian customary system is significant, because it
represented the system that dispensed grants based on the unique
characteristics of the invention. In other words, this was the system used to
tailor patent protection through the conferral of terms and penalties that
were not determined a priori, as under the statutory system, but were
instead, decided by the Venetian Senate (the “Senate”) for each invention
at the time of issuance, respectively.17
How did the Senate determine which term and penalty to grant in each
case? In this article, I use original documents from the Venice State
Archive to show that the Venetian Republic provided different terms and
penalties based on the unique characteristics of the invention, including the
industry to which the invention belonged. I reached this conclusion by
analyzing all the customary patents issued by the Senate between 1560 and
1580. In particular, the investigation revealed that during the relevant time
period, inventions in the Water and Energy industry received, on average,
more protection than inventions in other industries. As will be explained in
this article, possible explanations for the higher level of protection granted
to inventions in these two industries relate to Venice’s location and the
specific historical circumstances in which such grants were made.
This article describes an important historical example of tailored
patent protection provided by the issuing authority, the Venetian Senate, to
different inventions. It raises the question of what can be learned from the
Venetian experience to provide better incentives to inventors in different
fields, as well as to increase patent quality. Finally, it inquires whether we
should redesign the role of the USPTO. As mentioned, in recent years

13

Id.
Id.
15 Id.
16 Luigi Sordelli, Interesse Sociale e Progresso Tecnico Nella “Parte” Veneziana del 19 Marzo
1474 Sulle Privative Agli Inventori, 23 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE 358, 358-410 (1974) (It.)
[hereinafter Sordelli, Interesse Sociale].
17 Id.
14
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numerous scholars have criticized the current role of the USPTO, arguing
that Congress should provide general rule-making authority in patent law to
this administrative agency similar to the authority provided to other
administrative agencies in their respective fields.18 However, other scholars
have opposed granting more power to the USPTO both because of its past
record of inefficiencies and the possibility of agency capture.19 While the
issue of past USPTO inefficiencies could be quickly resolved with the
allocation of more funding to this entity, the problem of agency capture is
more complex.20 Thus, the need to study the way in which the Venetian
Senate efficiently provided tailored patent protection becomes imperative.
In fact, it seems unlikely that the Venetian Senate operated completely
immune to external influences. Notwithstanding this possible limitation, the
Senate managed to create a successful system of protection that lasted more
than three centuries and enabled Venice to become the dominant European
city of that time. Furthermore, the same patent system was later adopted as
a model throughout Europe and reached the United States in the eighteenth
century. Thus, the history of Venetian patent protection seems to indicate
that it is possible to effectively address the agency capture problem that
might permeate the activity of the issuing authority. At a minimum, as
Sarah Tran suggested, it appears that it could be used to benefit the system,
rather than harm it.21 This benefit could be achieved by using the
interaction with lobbyists to acquire additional important information about
the characteristics and requirements of the various industries.22
Part I of the article provides the necessary background information for
this research. Specifically, it discusses the history of the Venetian Republic
and briefly explains how patent protection was provided in Venice between
the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries. Part II describes the investigation
conducted at the State Archive in Venice and its results, paying particular
attention to the industry-specific analysis and the way in which the terms
and penalties of the patent were granted by the Senate to different
inventions. Part III highlights the implications of this study for modern
18

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT, supra
note 6, at 106-07; Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1559, 1575-78 (2006); Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1984 (2009); Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 675, 686 (2009); Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s
Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2054 (2009); Ryan Vacca, Acting Like
an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 MO. L. REV. 733, 754-55 (2011).
20 See Masur, supra note 6, at 301-02, 312-15 (describing the complexity of agency capture
critiques of the PTO).
21 Tran, supra note 6, at 529-32.
22 Id.
19
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patent systems in terms of both the possibility of using the Venetian
experience as a guide to provide tailored patent protection today, as well as
the need to reconsider the USPTO role in this context. Finally, the
conclusion presents some suggestions for the work that could be
undertaken in future studies with respect to tailoring patent protection and
improving patent quality.
I.

PATENT LAW BETWEEN THE 15TH AND 18TH CENTURIES IN
THE VENETIAN REPUBLIC

The Venetian Senate began issuing ad hoc patents, privilegi
(translated into English, privileges), to protect technological inventions in
1416.23 Subsequently, on March 19, 1474, the Venetian Republic enacted
what is widely recognized to be the first patent act in the world with a large
majority (116 for, ten against, and three abstentions).24 The 1474 Act
23

See Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra note 16, at 363 (“L’aver impiegato la forma del privilegio,
del resto usuale in quell tempo a Venezia anche per alter materie (ad esempio per concessioni di
cittadinanza), stava a significare l’impiego di un modo formale già conosciuto e che rispondesse ad
esigenze di dettare disposizioni caso per caso, come nella specie ricorreva in tema di invenzioni, per
dare ai richiedenti facoltà particolari.” [“Using the form of the privilege, which, after all, was typical
also for other subject matters at that time in Venice (for example for granting citizenship), meant to
adopt a known, formal way to respond to the need for regulating case-by-case, like in the case of
inventions, and give petitioners special powers.”]); infra Part I.B The Origin of Patent Protection. See
also Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra note 16, at 371 (“Queste notazioni servono a spiegare una
situazione concreta esistente nei secoli dal XIII al XV ed al XVI a Venezia . . . in quel period fosse
usuale servirsi dello strumento del privilegio . . . per far sorgerere in capo ai richiedenti dei diritti
esculsivi con poteri di escludere terzi per l’attuazione di macchine, meccanismi, artifici che
costituiscono cioe trovati aventi . . . le caratteristiche di invenzioni.” [“These remarks are necessary to
explain a concrete situation which was present in Venice between the 13th and 15th century and the
16th century . . . when it was common to use the privilege tool to grant petitioners exclusive rights with
the power to exclude third parties to make machines, mechanisms, artifices which constitute discoveries
. . . having the characteristics of inventions.”]).
24 See, e.g., ROBERTO BERVEGLIERI, INVENTORI STRANIERI A VENEZIA, 1474-1788: IMPORTAZIONE
DI TECNOLOGIA E CIRCOLAZIONE DI TECNICI ARTIGIANI INVENTORI. REPERTORIO (1995) (It.); ROBERT
P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW POLICY: CASE AND MATERIALS 3 (6th ed. 2013); Luca
Molà, Il Mercato delle Innovazioni nell’Italia del Rinascimento, in LE TECHNICIEN DANS LA CITÉ EN
EUROPE OCCIDENTALE 1250-1650 (Mathieux Arnoux & Pierre Monnet eds., 2004) (Fr.); CRAIG A.
NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 11 (3d ed. 2014); John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of
Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 23 (2007); Shubha Ghosh, Exclusivity—The Roadblock to
Democracy? 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 799, 805 (2006); Pamela O. Long, Invention, Authorship,
“Intellectual Property” and the Origin of Patents: Notes Towards a Conceptual History, 32 TECH. &
CULTURE 846, 878 (1991); Giulio Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), 34
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE 511 (1936) (It.), translated in Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents
(1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166 (1948); Giulio Mandich, Primi Riconoscimenti Veneziana di
un Diritto ai Privativa agli Inventori, 7 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE 101 (1958) (It.), translated
in Giulio Mandich, Venetian Origins of Inventors’ Rights, 42 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 378 (1960);
Christopher May, The Venetian Moment: New Technologies, Legal Innovation and the Institutional
Origins of Intellectual Property, 20 PROMETHEUS 159, 160 (2002); Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra
note 16.
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conferred the exclusive authority to issue patents in Venice upon an
administrative body called the Provveditori di Comun.25 Nevertheless, the
Venetian Senate continued to grant patents to inventors until the end of the
Republic in 1797.26 Scholars have generally explained this inconsistency in
two ways. The majority argued that after 1474, patents were granted in
Venice based on the 1474 Act, or in other words, based on the newly
established statutory patent system. Specifically, the majority of scholars
contended that the 1474 Act formalized and superseded the previous,
customary system of senatorial grants.27 However, they also claimed that
the statute was loosely applied.28 Consequently, although the 1474 Act
granted the power to issue patents to the Provveditori di Comun, in
practice, the Senate continued to serve as the entity that granted patent
protection based on the criteria codified in the 1474 Act. Moreover, the
discovery of a few patents issued in full compliance with the 1474 Act,
notably granted by the Proveditori di Comun, with a ten years term and a
100 ducats penalty, represented exceptions to what was instead the normal
application of the statute.29 Alternatively, one other scholar claimed that the
25

See infra note 69.
Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra note 16, at 376.
27 See, e.g., Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 517;
Mandich, Primi Riconoscimenti Veneziana di un Diritto ai Privativa agli Inventori, supra note 24, at
134, 143.
28 See, e.g., R. Berveglieri & C. Poni, Three Centuries of Venetian Patents 1474-1796, ACTA
HISTORIAE RERUM NATURALIUM NEC NON TECHNICARUM 17, 381 (1982); BRUCE W. BUGBEE,
GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW (1967); LUCA MOLÀ, THE SILK INDUSTRY OF
RENAISSANCE VENICE 188 (2000); John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685 (2002); Maximilian Frumkin, Early History of Patents for Invention, 26
TRANSACTIONS NEWCOMEN SOC’Y 47 (1947); M. Frumkin, The Origin of Patents, 27 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 143 (1945); Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24; Frank D.
Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 711 (1944); Craig
A. Nard & Andrew P. Morriss, Constitutionalizing Patents: From Venice to Philadelphia, 2 REV. L. &
ECON 223 (2006); Frank D. Prager, Examination of the Inventions from the Middle Ages to 1836, 46 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 268 (1964); Frank D. Prager, Standards of Patentable Inventions from 1474 to 1952,
20 U. CHI. L. REV. (1952).
29
In his investigation at the Venice State Archive, Mandich discovered five statutory patents,
issued in full compliance with the statute, which he considered to be atypical application of the 1474
Act. He discusses the five privileges at page 136 and, in particular, in footnote 74 of Primi
Riconoscimenti. Mandich, Primi Riconoscimenti Veneziana di un Diritto ai Privativa agli Inventori,
supra note 24, at 136 n.74. They are: Faustino Bergnano, ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Scritture, busta 6,
registro 1, carta 3 recto and verso (issued on Mar. 14, 1592); Paris di Nolli and Marc’Aurelio Gaburro,
ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Scritture, busta 6, registro 1, carta 5 recto (issued on July 10, 1592);
Piero Caracello, ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Scritture, busta 6, registro 1, carta 90 recto (issued on
Dec. 16, 1593); Piero Bordin , ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Scritture, busta 6, registro 1, carta 109
recto (issued on Apr. 18, 1594); Zuanne Tramontano, ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Scritture, busta 6,
registro 1, carta 185 verso (issued on July 10, 1595). See id. Moreover, in his previous work, Le
Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), Mandich seems to acknowledge the existence of statutory
patents by saying that “based on the 1474 Act, patents should have been issued by the Provveditori di
26
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1474 Act was a first abortive attempt to create a statutory patent system.30
He argued that when the 1474 Act was implemented, interested subjects
forgot about its existence and simply continued to adhere to the previous
practice of privileges issued by the Senate.31
Nevertheless, in 1974, an Italian law professor, Luigi Sordelli, from
the University of Siena questioned the validity of these explanations and
suggested that following the enactment of the 1474 Act in Venice, it was
possible to obtain patent protection in two ways: through the statutory
system newly created by the 1474 Act, and through the much older
customary system characterized by direct, ad hoc patents issued by the
Senate.32 In other words, in Sordelli’s opinion, the 1474 Act did not replace
or formalize the previous practice of senatorial grants.33 On the contrary, he
convincingly argued that “at that time, even after they enacted the ‘statute,’
the Senate (the most important legislative body of the Republic), would not
deem its power to grant single privileges or special ones with higher or
different terms than those indicated in the law to be limited [in any way].”34
Moreover, Sordelli added that insufficient investigation at the Venice State
Archives rather than to the failure to implement the statute resulted in only
a few extant patents issued by the Provveditori di Comun in full

Comun, but the Scritture, that are kept at the Venice State Archive and collect few grants issued by the
Provveditori in conformity to the aforementioned statute, are dated only from 1562.” (translated
from Italian) (emphasis added). Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note
24, at 523 n.4. In this way, Mandich appears to argue that, because the relative documents are not extant
anymore (over time the Venice Achieves have been subject to nine or ten fires—the most devastating
one in 1577—and the Scritture dating before 1562 have been lost), it is impossible to determine if there
has been any substantial, literal application (not just the issuance of “few grants”) of the 1474 Act
immediately following its enactment. See id. at 523. For information about the fires that destroyed part
of the Scritture, see ANDREA DA MOSTO, L’ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI VENEZIA, TOMO V (1937) (It.),
http://www.archiviodistatovenezia.it/siasve/DaMosto_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L2H-AMB7].
30 REMO FRANCESCHELLI, TRATTATO DI DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE (1960) (It.);
Remo Franceschelli, La Prima Legge Generale in Materia di Invenzioni Industriali (la “Parte”
Veneziana 19 Marzo 1474), 4 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE 371, 371-73 (1955) (It.).
31 Id.
32 Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra note 16, at 380 (“Therefore, this allows . . . to see the
coexistence of industrial privileges granted by the Senate and privileges granted by the Provveditori di
Comun because of the power given to them by a law . . . issued by the Senate.”) (tran slated from
Italian ).
33 Id. at 378.
34 Id. at 379 (“[N]el periodo in esame, il Senato (il maggior organo legislative della Repubblica)
potesse non sentirsi limitato nella sua sovranità anche dopo l’emanazione della “parte,” nel concedere
privilegi singoli o speciali in termini maggiori o diversi dalla legge”). Moreover, Sordelli noted that “in
the XVI century and, generally, around that time in Venice . . . it was known the super power of the
Senate and its tendency to centralize all the functions used to regulate the life of the State in political and
economic matters . . .” (quoting ENRICO BESTA, IL SENATO VENEZIANO (ORIGINI, COSTITUZIONE,
ATTRIBUZIONI E RITI) (1899)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Id.
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compliance with the specifications of the Act.35 In these respects, it is
notable that in 2000 Luca Molà, an associate professor and Director of the
Centre for the History of Innovation and Creativity at the University of
Warwick, managed to identify fifteen more statutory patents at the Venice
State Archive.36 More significantly, in recent years, 85 additional patents
issued by the Provveditori di Comun have been discovered. These
additional patents are fully examined in a separate paper that I co-authored
with Ted Sichelman and Toni Veneri, in which we provide conclusive
evidence that Sordelli’s hypothesis was correct and shed important new
light on the true origin of patent law.37
The existence of two parallel systems of patent protection for
inventions manifests great relevance for the research described in this
paper, because tailoring patent protection in Venice functioned exclusively
through Senatorial privileges. Indeed, the conditions for the patents issued
under the 1474 Act, in particular, in regard to their terms and penalties for
infringement, were established ad priori and were the same for all the
inventions. As explained below, the situation in the context of patents
issued under the customary system was different—the Senate had
unconditional power to decide the number of years of exclusivity, as well
as the consequences for violating the patent in each case. In this way, the
Senate could customize the protection granted and promote certain
inventions over others. Therefore, this article focuses on the Venetian
customary system. After a brief historical overview and description of the
statutory patent system, Part I explains how inventors could obtain
Senatorial privileges and the relevance of these grants for the protection of
inventions in different industries.
A. Brief Historical Background of the Venetian Republic
The history of Venice begins around the year 697 with the
organization of the lagoon as an autonomous military outpost and the
election of its first dux, the Doge, by the local population.38
35 See Franceschelli, La Prima Legge Generale in Materia di Invenzioni Industriali (la “Parte”
Veneziana 19 Marzo 1474), supra note 30, at 377. Franceschelli noted that a lot of the records
collecting documents relevant for the determination of the activity of the Provveditori di Comun during
the period immediately after the enactment of the 1474 Act are not extant anymore. Consequently, it is
impossible to determine if the patent statute was applied soon after its adoption or with some delay. See
also Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24.
36 Luca Molà identified fifteen more patents issued directly by the Provveditori di Comun and
making explicit reference to the 1474 Act. See MOLÀ, supra note 28.
37 Ted Sichelman, Stefania Fusco & Toni Veneri, Retracing the Origins of the
Patent System (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
38 See FREDERIC C. LANE, STORIA DI VENEZIA 8 (1978) (It.) (the term Doge derives from the Latin
word dux translated as “military leader.” The Doge of Venezia was the chief magistrate and leader of
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Notwithstanding the independent designation of a leader, at that time
Venice was under the direct control of the Byzantine Empire.39 The close
relationship between the lagoon and the Emperor of Constantinople was
signified by the fact that the Doge received orders from Ravenna, the center
of the Byzantine power in Italy, for at least the next two centuries.40
The Byzantine Empire’s influence progressively weakened over time,
and by the beginning of the 9th century, Venice had acquired de facto
independence, while nominally remaining Byzantine.41 In the meantime,
Venice had refused to subject itself to the authority of Charlemagne, who
became Emperor in 800 and unified most of Western Europe under the
Carolingian Empire.42 By the year 1000, Venice was completely
independent and was determined to become what historians have called
“the freest of all the many Italian free-cities of that time.”43
After the year 1000, Venice rapidly evolved from a community of
fishermen, boatmen and small merchants into a maritime nation with
substantial supremacy on the Adriatic coasts.44 During the 12th century,
Venice became extremely wealthy through its control of trade between
Europe and the Levant, and even expanded its dominion beyond the
Adriatic Sea.45 Because of Venetian success in international trade and the
ensuing easy access that its merchants had within a growing number of new
markets, there was a significant increase in the international demand for
Venetian products, in addition to the sizable domestic demand.46
Consequently, during the 14th and 15th centuries, the need to expand the

the Republic); see also GINO BINOBENVENUTI, LE REPUBBLICHE MARINARE: AMALFI, PISA, GENOVA E
VENEZIA (1989) (It.); CHARLES DIEHL, LA REPUBBLICA DI VENEZIA (2007) (It.); 1 SAMUELE
ROMANIN, STORIA DOCUMENTATA DI VENEZIA (1860) (It.).
39 LANE, supra note 38, at 8.
40 The great influence of the Byzantine Empire over the Venetian Republic is clearly marked by the
lagoon’s political institutions and art; Id.
41 Id.
42 In 810 Charlemagne sent his son, Pepin, to conquer Venice and the Byzantine Emperor
intervened on behalf of Venice with his army to reaffirm his authority over the lagoon. With the Pax
Nicephori, Charlemagne promised the Byzantine emperor, Nikephoros I, to renounce reducing the
lagoon of Venice and Dalmatia under his power. DONALD M NICOL, BYZANTIUM AND VENICE: A
STUDY IN DIPLOMATIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS 23 (1988); see also ROBERTO CESSI, 1-2 PACTA
VENETA, in 4-5 ARCHIVIO VENETO (1928-1929) (It.). While it was also formally stipulated that the
Venetian territory, called “dogato,” belonged to the Byzantine Empire, Venice remained under the
leadership of the Doge whose actions did not reflect the Emperor’s orders anymore; LANE, supra note
38, at 8.
43 Venice also avoided being subjected to the authority of the various German tribes that descended
onto the Italian peninsula after the collapse of the Roman Empire. LANE, supra note 38, at 7.
44 Id.
45 JOHN JULIUS NORWICH, A HISTORY OF VENICE (1982).
46 LANE, supra note 38, at 184.
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production of local goods to satisfy foreign markets was of primary
importance, for what at that point had become the Republic of Venice, or
the Serenissima Repubblica.47 It is in this context that the Venetian
government began issuing “ad hoc” patents, called privilegi,48 which were
primarily granted by the Senate through private Acts.49
The purpose of these privilegi, at least initially, was to lure foreign
artisans and induce them to bring their knowledge and techniques to
Venice.50 The idea was to promote innovation and boost the local
production of goods by introducing new technologies and increasing
competition. In fact, as Ted Sichelman and Sean O’Connor have previously
pointed out, these initial “patents were not negative rights to exclude, as
today, but positive privileges or licenses to practice.”51 In other words,
these were “pro-competitive patents” designed to break the monopoly of
the local trade associations of specialist artisans and merchants, the guilds,
by conferring non-members the possibility of selling products and
practicing methods of production, which were otherwise forbidden to
them.52 The next subsection fully explains the reasons for the creation of
the first system of patent protection in the world.53
B. The Origin of Patent Protection
Since the beginning of the 12th century, the activity of artisans and
merchants had been highly regulated in Venice.54 Specifically, in 1173, the
Venetian government passed legislation that granted the guilds exclusive
rights to practice “mechanical trades,” such as glassmaking, shipbuilding
and silk making.55 Moreover, foreign nationals were generally excluded
from becoming guild members. In a time of extraordinary economic growth

47 On April 15, 1423, Francesco Foscari became Doge and acquired the title of Prince, Serenissimo
Principe. Contextually, the Serenissima Signoria, a supreme government body comprising the Doge,
six advisers to the Doge called the Minor Consiglio and three leaders of the Quaratia (the supreme
judicial tribunal), was created by the Maggior Consiglio (a political organ with the power to create laws).
The Commune of Venice ceased to exist and became the Serenissima Repubblica. FREDERICK C. LANE,
VENICE: A MARITIME REPUBLIC 112 (1973).
48 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
49 Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 12, at 1273-78.
50 Id. at 1269.
51 Id. (“Unlike today’s patent systems—which solely encompass negative rights to exclude against
the backdrop of a generally free market—the Venetian patent system provide a dual right, part of which
allowed the patent holder to compete in an otherwise regulated system dominated by the guilds.”).
52 Id.
53 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
54 Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 12, at 1273-78.
55 RICHARD J. GOY, VENETIAN VERNACULAR ARCHITECTURE: TRADITIONAL HOUSING IN THE
VENETIAN LAGOON 93-94 (1989).
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and expansion in international trade, such as that in 14th century Venice,
these regulations must have appeared to be significant limitations on the
full exploitation of the many opportunities that the Venetian policy of
independence and colonialism provided.56 However, conflicts emerged at
that time between Venetian merchants, who had the capital and skills to
pursue those opportunities and artisans, who wanted to protect their
markets and traditional ways of production.57
Ultimately, the Venetian government opted to open the city’s doors to
innovation and competition.58 Therefore, commencing in the early 13th
Century, the Grand Council of Venice, the Maggior Consiglio, began
granting licenses to build various kinds of machines, such as innovative
mills and water pumps, to individuals who were not members of the related
guilds.59 The beneficiaries of these licenses were often foreigners with
skills and technologies unknown in Venice.60 However, it soon became
obvious that these licenses failed to give adequate protection to inventors
and skilled artisans.61 That is, they did not provide the possibility of
precluding others—guild-members, in particular—from copying the new
trades, methods, and machines that began appearing in Venetian territory.62
Consequently, inventors likely have complained and petitioned for
something more than the mere privilege of competing with the guilds. They
likely have requested the much more significant right to exclude others
from practicing their inventions.63 The first patent incorporating
exclusionary rights that we know of was granted by the Maggior Consiglio
in 1416 to Ser Francisus Petri, perhaps unsurprisingly a foreigner, for a
device to full wool (that is, a device to turn wool into felt).64
During the following three centuries until the end of the Republic in
1796, the Venetian government issued thousands of patents to both
foreigners and nationals for a wide variety of inventions, including
watermills, canal-dredging equipment, food-processing machines, soap
formulations and dyeing methods.65 By the 16th century, Venice had
56

See Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 12, at 1268-69.
LANE, supra note 38, at 184.
58 Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 12, at 1274, 1278.
59 Id. at 1274.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 ASV, Maggior Consiglio, Deliberazioni, registro 22, carta 7 verso (image file number 15v)
(issued on Feb. 20, 1415) (the term of this patent was 50 years); see also Mandich, Primi
Riconoscimenti Veneziana di un Diritto ai Privativa agli Inventori, supra note 24.
64 Id.
65 See infra Part II; see also Molà, supra note 24.
57
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undergone a complete transformation, having become the center of
technological development in Europe,66 and having changed from a nation
of sailors into a nation of mainly artisans and engineers.67 The full
description of the Venetian Republic’s system of patent protection is the
subject of the next subsection.
C. The Venetian Patent Systems: Customary Patents and Statutory Patents
In 1974, Luigi Sordelli explained that between the 15th and 18th
centuries two systems of patent protection were operating concurrently in
Venice: one based on customary law, and the other based on the 1474
Patent Act.68 This part of the article first briefly describes the statutory
system, and then focuses on the customary system to provide information
relevant to understanding the mechanisms that the Venetian government
used to promote certain industries over others.
1. The Statutory System
The Venetian statutory patent system was based on a patent act
enacted by the Senate in 1474. Under the 1474 Act, an inventor who
wanted to obtain a patent had to submit an application, called supplica, to
the office of the Provveditori di Comun.69 At that point, the Provveditori di
Comun reviewed the application and issued a response often stating that
“they had seen the invention,” and sometimes, that they had made a
determination about its social utility and novelty.70 Ultimately, if the result
of the review was positive, a privilegio was granted to the inventor. As
explained below, the review operated by the Provveditori di Comun for
statutory patents was much more limited than the one made for customary
patents, in which multiple agencies that specialized in different subject
matters were usually involved in the examination process.71 Consequently,
whereas reviewing the applications for senatorial patents could take several

66

Id.
LANE, supra note 38.
68 See supra Part I.
69 Sordelli noted that a copy of the 1474 Act was included in the “Capitolar Maggiore,” a
collection of laws and administrative acts from 1272 to 1600 used to define the competences of the
Provveditori di Commun. See Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra note 16, at 376 and 392. See also
Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 520. The Provveditori di
Comun was an executive department instituted in 1256. It was responsible for numerous subject matters
including: trade, the arts or arti (wool working, silk making, gold working etc.), shipbuilding,
glassmaking, streets, small channels, bridges, schools, immigration, and the association of doctors and
surgeons.
See
ORGANI
AMMINISTRATIVI
(It.),
http://www.icar.beniculturali.it/biblio/pdf/damosto_html/05_.html [https://perma.cc/FD68-VU4N].
70 Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra note 16, at 394-96.
71 See infra note 72. See also supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
67
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months, the one for patents granted by the Provveditori di Commun was
cursory, and resulted in the issuance of a privilege soon after the
submission of the supplica.72
A typical example of a privilegio issued by the Provveditori di Comun
is reported below:
We, Advise Manin, Fantin Diego and Zuanne Danodo, for the Illustrious and
Eminent Ducal Domain of Venice Provveditori di Comun, having seen the
supplica produced before us this very day by Aleessandro Tornimben and Sir.
Gierolamo Prevaglio for which they have requested the grant of a privilege for
ten consecutive years, that no one aside from them or other [person having
authority from them], in this city or other lands or places in this Illustrious
Domain, will be allowed to make or have [other people] make in any way the
cakes . . . with seven kinds of dough and . . . all kinds of meat . . . and fish and
with the method and dosages found by the applicants . . . as it is possible to
read in their supplica . . . [S]ince We consider it to be a good thing to favor
new invention through [the exercise] of our authority and because of the
March 19, 1474 Act of the Worshipful Senate, we grant freedom and
privilege to the above mentioned Sir, Alessandro et Girolamo, that for ten
consecutive years no one aside from those [people having their permission]
will be able to make for the purpose of selling in these cities, lands and places
of this Illustrious Domain, the new inventions of cakes and other [things]
[made] in the way [described] above . . . under the penalty of 100 ducats and
of losing the things that will be found [at the time the infringement is
discovered], and of other penalties included in the Act to which all the
infringers are . . . subject; being however [understood] that the invention is
new and not being found by others . . . [and that] no other privilege has been
granted by others, being understood that this privilege cannot have a negative
impact on those who want to [make the cakes] at home or the host for the
advantage of their taverns, and, in the same way, being understood that the
pastry makers will not be limited to doing what they are permitted to do by
their [guild].73

72
See infra Part I.C.2. See also Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra
note 24, at 519 (arguing that, based on the words of the 1474 Act, the effect of the submission of the
application was the immediate issuance of the patent).
73 See ASV, Provveditori di Comun, busta 17, registro 33, carte 62 verso and 63 recto (issued on
Sept. 19, 1592) at 17 (“Noi Alvise Manin, Fantin Diedo et Zuanne Dandolo per l’Illustrissimo Ducal
Dominio di Venetia Provveditori de Comun veduta la supplicatione davanti di noi prodotta sotto il
presente giorno per ser Alessandro Tornimben et missier Gierolamo Prevaglio per la quale ci
ricercano che gli dobbiamo concederli privilegio per anni dieci continui altri che loro o cui da loro
haverà causa così in questa città come in altre terre et luochi di questo Illustrissimo Dominio non possi
far né far fare quovis modo la nova inventione di pastizzi fatti de cinque sorti di paste lavorati con ogni
sorte de carnami et uzzelami sì di grasso come di magro con pesce et senza fatti in diverse sorti foggie
et maniere et modi de dosi per loro supplicanti ritrovate et medesimamente sfogliade torte et giudoni et
offete (?) come nella loro supplicatione si legge alla qual si habbi relatione onde considerada Noi esser
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As this example illustrates, statutory patents made direct reference to
the 1474 Act and were issued in full application of the statute.74
Importantly, they were granted for a term of ten years and provided a
penalty of 100 ducats in cases of infringement.75 These two elements
fundamentally differentiate statutory patents from customary patents,
which did not have a fixed term or penalty.76 Thus, a Venetian statutory
patent was the result of a straightforward process detailed in the Patent Act
and characterized by a limited review of the application conducted by the
issuing authority, the Provveditori di Comun.
On the other hand, depending on the characteristics of the invention,
the customary patents could provide more and stronger rights, and were the
result of a much more extensive examination of the application than the
patents issued under the 1474 Act. In other words, as discussed in detail in
the next subsection, customary patents were the tools to obtain tailored, and
often, stronger patent protection for inventions in the Venetian Republic.
2. The Customary System
Between the 15th and 18th centuries, patent protection could also be
obtained in the Venetian Republic through customary law.77 In this case,
applicants had the option of submitting an application, or supplica, which
was addressed to the Doge or, sometimes, the Doge and the Signoria.78 The
supplica was then transmitted to the Minor Consiglio, which in turn,
assigned one or more of its departments to the substantive examination of
the invention based on its subject matter.79 The executive departments that
were frequently involved in the review of patent applications were80:
cosa giusta a favorir nove inventioni per auttorità del magistrato nostro et virtù della parte
dell’Eccellentissimo Senato, 1474 19 marzo concedemo libertà et privilegio alli suddetti ser
Alessandro et Gierolamo che per anni X continuij alcuno sij chi esser si vogli non possi far né far fare
per vender in questa città né altre città terre et luochi di questo Illustrissimo Dominio le nove inventioni
di far pastizzi et altro, nel modo come di sopra sì come hanno supplicato sotto pena de ducati cento et
perdita delle robbe che seranno ritrovate et altre pene contenute nella detta parte, alla qual sottozasi
tutti li transgressori inremissibilmente essendo però inventione nova non più d’altri ariccordata né ad
altri statoli concesso privilegio, intendendosi che il presente privelegio non possi far pregiudicio a
quelli che volessero fare per casa loro alli pasti banchetti né etiam alli osti per commodo delle loro
hostarie, et così s’intendi alli scalletteri non gli sij pregiudicato di far quel tanto che ad essa arte gli è
concesso. Datum die xix Septembris 1592.”) (emphasis added).
74 Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra note 16, at 376 and 392.
75 See Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
76 See infra Part II.2.
77 See Sordelli, Interesse Sociale, supra note 16.
78 Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 520, 523. The
Serenissima Signoria was the supreme government body of the Venetian Republic and comprised the
Doge, the Minor Consiglio and three leaders of the Quaratia. See LANE, supra note 38.
79 Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 523 (noting that the
reason for the involvement of different magistrates could be to guarantee the inventor’s rights by
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Provveditori di Comun, for all kinds of inventions;81



Savi ed Essecuatori alle Acque, for inventions related to water;



Sopraprovveditori e Provveditori alle Biave, for inventions related to
agriculture, food-processing machines and ovens;



Cinque Savii alla Mercantia, for inventions related to trade;



Provveditori Sopra la Seta, for inventions related to silk working;



Provveditori alla Sanità, for health-related invention.

In the case of Sebastano di Silvestri, who in 1560 submitted a supplica
for a “new method to provide energy to certain draining water machines,”82
the Minor Consiglio assigned its prosecution to the Provveditori di Comun
and the Savi ed Essecuatori alle Acque. Typically, the notation of the
assignment, comprising a preset formula, was added by the secretary of the
Minor Consiglio under the text of the original application. In Silvestri’s
case it states:
The Savi ed Essecuatori alle Acque and the Proveditor di Comun will answer
this supplica and, having seen the [invention], will declare and sign their
opinion under oath and according to the laws.83

In the supplica, the inventor would generally provide her name, her
origin, a description of the invention, and an assertion that the invention
was new, ingenious and useful.84 Further, a statement referring to the
significant cost and the amount of work necessary to produce the invention
was often present.85 The inventor would also expressly request granting the

protecting her from the arbitrary judgement of a single deciding body); see also infra Part II. The Minor
Consiglio was a constitutional body of the Republic and comprised six advisors to the Doge, who
administered his affairs. See LANE, supra note 38.
80 See generally, Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 523;
Molà, supra note 24.
81 For most applications, regardless of subject matter, the examination was performed by
Provveditori di Comun often together with one or two other executive departments of the Minor
Consiglio. See Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 523.
82 Sebastano di Silvestri, ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra, registro 43, carta 20v (image file
number 81) (issued on Nov. 2, 1560).
83 Id. (“Respondeant huic supplicatione Domini Sapientes et Executores super Acquis, necnon
Domini Proveditores Communis, et visis videndis dicant eorum opinionem cum iuramento et
subscriptione manuum suarum iuxta leges.”).
84 Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 521 (“[T]he
applications were from citizens of Venice, subjects of the Domain, foreigners [coming] from the
peninsula, artisans, merchants, nobles and, in 1508, for the first time, also from a Jew. [A considerable
number of petitioners] were companies . . . It is also [necessary] to remember that a lot of petitioners
remained anonymous until they received the grant.”) (translated from Italian).
85 Id. at 522.

317

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

privilegio—its attendant exclusive rights with geographic coverage and a
term of protection.86 Finally, in the majority of the cases, she would ask for
a penalty in case of infringement of the patent.87 Sebastano di Silvestri’s
application again represents a useful example. It states:
I, Sebastian di Silvestri Domino, son of the excellent Sr. Marin, having found
an easy, fast, very effective and inexpensive method of providing energy to
[certain draining water machines] . . . humbly petition Your Grace to grant a
privilege to me that nobody in this Illustrious Domain would be able to use
similar methods without a license or an authorization from me or my heirs or
other person having authority from me, for a term of 50 years. Under penalty
of 25 ducats and of losing the instrument or machine that [the infringer]
had built.88

Once the examination was complete, the various executive
departments involved in the review process recorded their recommendation
to grant or reject the privilege in their official records and sent it to the
Minor Consiglio.89 In some cases, they also expressed an opinion regarding
the requested term. Thus, in Silvestri’s case, the Savi ed Essecuatori alle
Acque wrote:
[W]e humbly answer that our opinion is that [Your Grace] should grant the
privilege, with the condition, however, that [the invention] will not create an
obstacle to the flow of the water . . . and that the requested term of 50 years
appears too high, that 25 years should be enough.90

At that point, assuming a positive result of the substantive
examination, the application moved forward and was presented by
individual councilors of the Minor Consiglio to the Senate for vote.91 If

86

See also infra Part II.
See also infra Part II.
88 Silvestri, supra note 82 (“Impero` havendo io Sebastian di Silvestri Domino figliol
dell’eccellente missier Marin, ritrovato un modo di dar un moto facile veloce e di gran forza et poca
spesa, a [edifici da scolar acqua] . . . supplico riverentemente Vostra Serenita` che mi voglia
conciedere grazia, che nuino sotto questo Illustrissimo Dominio adoperar simil sorte di moto senza
licentia et voluntà mia et de mei heredi o cui heverà causa da me per spacio de anni 50. Sotto la pena
di ducati 25 et di perder lo instrumento over edificio che evesse fatto . . . .”).
89 See Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 524-25.
90 Silvestri, supra note 82 (“[R]iveramente rispondemo nostro parer esser che per Vostra Sublimità
li sia concessa la grazia, con condizione però che non se impedisca il corso delle acque . . . ne pare che
il tempo che’l richiede de 50 anni sia troppo, ch eli possa bastar havendo de anni 25 . . . .”
)(demonstrating negotiations resulting in limited term of protection).
91 Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24, at 524-25, (noting that
“the patent granted by the Senate—called “privilegio” or “gratia”—is, generally, [issued] in
conformity, [perhaps] with some modification, with the supplica . . . . Indeed one of the formulas often
used for the grant says: ‘we grant what the aforementioned petitioner has requested’ (‘quod
87
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approved, a brief summary of the grant was recorded in the official register
of the Senate, called registri.92 In Silvestri’s case, the Senate,
notwithstanding the fact that the very influential Provveditori di Comun,
also assigned to the case, had approved the requested 50 years, ultimately
decided to follow the recommendation of the Savi ed Essecuatori alle
Acque and granted a privilegio with a 25-year term. The grant states:
Under the authority of this Council it is granted to Domino Sebastaino di
Silvestri that for 25 years no one aside from him or other person having
authority from him, in this city or other city or place in our Domain, can use
the new, easy, fast, inexpensive and very effective method that he has found to
provide energy to various machines invented by engineers to drain and absorb
water under the penalty included in his supplica,93

As the Silvestri case illustrates, contrary to the Venetian statutory
patents, the Venetian customary patents did not have a fixed term and
penalty. Based on the original documents examined at the Venice State
Archive for this research, customary patents could be granted for 10, 20,
25, 30, 40, 50 or 60 years.94 They could also be granted “for life,” or in
perpetuity.95 Similarly, there was significant variation in the assigned
penalties, which could range from two ducats per infringing item to a flat
1,000 ducat fine.96 The Senate possessed the ultimate authority to decide
both the term and the penalty in each case.97 Specifically, the Senate had
the power to decide whether to grant the term requested by the inventor in
her supplica or to reject it and grant a different one, typically, a shorter
term.98
The Senate’s ability to decide the term is a key element in my research
because it illustrates the fact that the Venetian government had the power
to control the level of incentives provided to different industries. The same
argument could be made in the case of the assignment of the penalty, but,
suprascripto supplicani concedatur sictu petit’), in this way causing the content of the supplica to be
incorporated in the patent”).
92 Id.
93 Silvestri, supra note 82 (“Che per autorita` di questo Consiglio sia concesso a Domino
Sebastiano di Silvestri che per 25 anni alcun altro che esso, ochi avera` causa da lui non possa in questa
città, nè in alcun’altra città o luogo del Dominio nostro senza permission sua usar il modo ritrovato
novamente da lui di dar un moto facile, veloce, di poca spesa, et di gran forza alli edificij, che sono stà
ritrovati da diversi ingegneri per scollar, et scigar acque, et si come nella sua supplicatione sotto le
pene contenute in essa . . . .”) (emphasis added).
94 See infra Part II.
95 See infra Part II.
96 See infra Part II.
97 See infra Part II; see also Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note
24, at 525.
98 See infra Part II.
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as explained in the next section, this aspect of the customary system seems
to have served a different function. Specifically, it appears to have been
related to both the costs of policing possible infringements and the
execution of what could be considered to be an injunction to destroy the
infringing copy or copies of the invention, rather than the need to induce
inventors to produce new knowledge. Consequently, the Senate’s
determination of the terms and penalties of the customary patents will be
the subject of a full analysis in the next section.
II. TAILORED PATENT PROTECTION IN THE VENETIAN
REPUBLIC
The Venetian Senate issued a few thousand customary patents
between the 15th and the 18th centuries.99 As discussed in the previous
section, customary patents did not have a fixed term of protection and
penalty.100 The term was generally the subject of a request by the applicant
in her supplica. However, in more than 60% of the cases, the Senate
rejected the requested term and granted a different one.101 Similarly, the
penalty was decided by the Senate with or without deference to what the
applicant had asked in her application. For example, on March 22, 1567,
Giacomo Bellasio and his brothers requested a patent for a new mill that
made “all the [loom’s] spindles to spin equally, so that without a lot of
effort and inconvenience the silk result[ed] evenly woven and stronger . . .
and more beautiful than when other mills [were used].”102 The applicants
requested a term of 20 years and a penalty of 500 ducats, but the Senate
granted only 15 years and 300 ducats.103 How did the Senate decide on the
term and penalty for this and other inventions protected through the
customary system? This part of the article focuses on this question and
demonstrates that the Venetian government used its power to decide the
patent’s terms as a tool to incentivize certain industries more than others.
A. The Investigation at the State Archives in Venice
In order to understand how the Venetian Senate determined the term
and penalty of customary patents, I conducted a thorough analysis of the
original documents available at the Venice State Archive. Specifically, I
99

Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), supra note 24.
See supra Part I.C.2.
101 See infra Part II.B.
102 ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Scritture, busta 5, registro 1 (“[T]utti essi fusi girano egualmente,
in modo che senza tanta fatica, et fastidio le sederiescano ugualmente filade, e forte . . . et piu’ belle che
alli altri molini non fanno . . . .”).
103 ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra, registro 46, carta 121 recto (image file number 290).
100
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decided to identify and study all of the customary patents issued by the
Senate between 1560 and 1580.
The decision to focus on this period was driven, in part, by the fact
that the records of the various authorities involved in the prosecution of the
customary patents are often incomplete and do not entirely encompass the
approximately 350 years of the system’s operation.104 For example, the
extant Senate’s registri are available for almost the full period of the
Venetian patent system’s existence. However, the extant scritture of the
Provveditori di Comun that were not lost or destroyed, only extend about
twenty years: 1562-1566; 1567-1570; 1570-1577; 1591-1596.105
Consequently, not all of the periods can be analyzed in detail.
On the other hand, the years between 1560 and 1580 appear to be
particularly appropriate for the purpose of providing a full understanding of
the customary patent system. In fact, by the end of the 16th century, this
system had reached its maturity.106 At the same time, the economy of the
Serenissima had completed its transformation and had turned into a
production economy.107 In addition, Venice had established itself as one of
the super powers of that time.108 Therefore, by the end of the 16th century,
the Venetian customary system operated in a strong economic and political
environment that had the benefit of almost 150 years of experience, and
had remained unaffected by the uncertainties and complications that
characterized the Republic’s subsequent period of decline. Ultimately, it
could be said, that by concentrating on the 20 years between 1560 and
1580, it is possible to observe the system at the height of its sophistication,
operating in a context of relative stability.109
The identification of the patents issued by the Senate during the
selected period required the meticulous and lengthy investigation of the
relevant authorities’ records. In particular, the analysis of the Senate’s
registri, in which all of the decisions issued by this authority were
recorded, revealed the patents granted between 1560 and 1580. The list of

104

Copies of these records’ indexes for the periods covered by each extant volume are on file with
the author.
105 Id. The main reason for missing records is fires, in particular the 1577 fire that devastated the
Doge’s palace. See 1 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS AND MANUSCRIPTS RELATING TO ENGLISH AFFAIRS
xxiv-xxv (ed. Rawdon Lubbock Brown, 1864).
106 Consider that by the end of the 16th century, patents were considered to be a commodity like
any other, which could be transferred, inherited and used for a dowry. Companies were formed to
acquire patents and trade on them as opposed to using them to develop related products. See Molà, supra
note 24.
107 See supra Part I.B.
108 LANE, supra note 38.
109 See Molà, supra note 24.
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the identified patents with the relative issuance dates was then used to
select the Senate’s files, the filze, in which the documentation of the
prosecution of the patents—a copy of the patent application with the
response of the Minor Consiglio, a copy of the executive departments’
opinions involved in the review process, and the final grant by the Senate—
was recorded. The Provveditori di Comun’s records, the scritture and atti,
in which copies of the patent applications and the result of this
department’s investigations were filed, helped to fill possible gaps in the
filze’s documentation. Finally, the review of the Collegio’s registry, the
Risposte di Dentro,110 in which the original patent applications were kept,
allowed completing the collection of the necessary data for this
investigation. In the end, a total of twelve Senate’s registri,111 twenty-nine
Senate’s filze,112 four Provveditori di Comun’s registries113—one scritture
and three atti, and three Collegio’s Risposte di Dentro114 were scrupulously
reviewed and analyzed. The investigation ultimately produced a list of 155
customary patents granted by the Senate during the relevant period with a
variety of terms of protection and penalties. The details of the identified
patents are the subject of a full discussion in the next subsection.

110 The Collegio had two registries: the Risposte di Dentro, “Answers from the Inside,” for
supplications coming from and/or concerning Venice; and the Risposte di Fuori, “Answers from the
Outside,” for supplications coming from and/or concerning the rest of the Republic’s domain. Patent
applications filed with the Minor Consiglio i.e. suppliche for a customary patent were kept in the
Risposte di Dentro.
111 ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra, registri: 42 (Mar. 6, 1559-Aug., 29 1560); 43 (Sept. 7,
1560-Feb. 28, 1561 m.v.); 44 (Mar. 7, 1562-Feb. 25, 1563 m.v.); 45 (Mar. 2, 1564-Feb. 23, 1565 m.v.);
46 (Mar. 1, 1566-Feb. 28, 1567 m.v.); 47 (Mar. 4, 1568-Feb. 20, 1569 m.v.); 48 (Mar. 2, 1570-Feb. 25,
1571 m.v.); 49 (Mar. 1, 1572-Feb. 24, 1573 m.v.); 50 (Mar. 6, 1574-Aug. 29, 1575 m.v.); 51 (Sept. 3,
1575-Aug. 30, 1577); 52 (Sept. 5, 1577-Feb. 20, 1579 m.v.); 53 (Mar. 1, 1580- Feb. 24, 1581 m.v.).
112 ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra, filze: 31 (Mar. 1560-Aug. 1560); 32 (Sept. 1560-Feb. 1560
m.v.); 33 (Mar. 1561-June 1561); 34 (July 1561-Oct. 1561); 35 (Nov. 1561-Feb. 1561 m.v.); 38 (Mar.
1563-Aug. 1563); 39 (Sept. 1563-Feb. 1563 m.v.); 40 (Mar. 1564-Aug. 1564); 41 (Sept. 1564-Nov.
1564); 48 (Nov. 20, 1566-Feb. 1566 m.v.); 49 (Mar. 1567-Aug. 1567); 52 (Sept. 1568-Feb. 1568 m.v.);
54 (Sept. 1569-Feb. 1569 m.v.); 57 (March 1571-Aug. 1571); 59 (Mar. 1572-Aug. 1572); 60 (Sept.
1572-Feb. 1572 m.v.); 63 (Mar. 1574-Aug. 1574); 67 (July 1575-Oct. 1575); 68 (Nov. 1575-Feb. 1575
m.v.); 71 (Mar. 1577-Aug. 1577); 73 (Mar. 1578-May 1578); 74 (June 1578-Aug. 1578); 75 (Sept.
1578- Nov. 1578); 76 (Dec. 1578-Feb. 1578 m.v.); 77 (Mar. 1579-June 1579); 78 (July 1579-Oct.
1579); 79 (Nov. 1579-Feb. 1579 m.v.); 80 (Mar. 1580-Aug. 1580); 81 (Sept. 1580-Feb. 1580 m.v.).
113 ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Scritture, busta 5: registro 7 (Oct. 1562-Nov. 1566; registro 8:
Mar. 1567-Dec. 1570; registro 9: Nov. 1570-Oct. 1577); ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Atti, busta 13
(registro 31: June 1558-Jan. 1559 m.v.); busta 14 (registro 32: Apr. 1560-Oct. 1561; registro 33: Mar. 1565May 1567); busta 15 (registro 34: July 1571-Aug. 1574).
114 ASV, Collegio, Risposte di Dentro, buste: 2 (1566-1567 m.v.); 3 (1568-1569 m.v.); 4
(1570-1571 m.v.).
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B. The Senate’s Tools—Terms and Penalties
The Venetian Senate had significant power to control the level of
incentives provided to inventors. In fact, as previously mentioned,115 the
Senate had the authority, at the time of the grant, to decide both the term of
protection as well as the penalty in case of infringement for each
invention.116 Specifically, this investigation revealed that during the twenty
years between 1560 and 1580, the Senate issued a total of 155 customary
patents and decided to grant terms equal to ten, fifteen, twenty, twenty-five,
thirty, forty, fifty and sixty years. Moreover, in four cases, the Senate
granted a term for “life” or “life plus the life of the heirs.” Finally, one
patent was issued without a term.117
Below, Chart 1, Distribution of Terms, illustrates the term distribution
in detail. Specifically, it reveals that during the relevant period, the most
frequently granted terms by the Senate were twenty, twenty-five and thirty
years, which corresponded to 31%, 33% and 20% of the patents,
respectively. Both ten and fifteen year terms each represented 4% of the
patents. The remaining 6% of the patents had terms equal to forty, fifty and
sixty years. Finally, the average number of years of protection was 25.42
years.118
115

See supra Part I.C.2.
See supra Part I.C.2.
117 ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra, registro 45 (issued on Feb. 3, 1565). Presumably, the patent
in this case had a perpetual term. However, for the purpose of the statistical analysis on the patent terms
discussed below, this patent was excluded from the dataset. To be sure, I ran the described calculation,
assigning terms of ten, sixty and eighty years to Piccolomini’s patent and the statistical results
highlighted in the paper did not change. See Appendix.
118 To calculate the average number of years protection and conduct the statistical analysis
described below, the following number of years have been assigned to patents that did not have a
numerical term: one patent with a term for “life” received sixty years; three patents with the term of
“life plus the life of the heirs” received eighty years. I determined the number of years to assign to these
patents considering that the highest numerical term granted by the Senate between 1560 and 1580 was
sixty years and that, presumably, the Senate with the term “life” wanted to grant a period of exclusivity
at least equal to that. Then, I assumed that “life plus the life of the heirs” term must have meant at least
addition twenty years over the “life” term. Alternatively, I considered the life expectancy of inventors in
the sixteenth century. Numerous studies discuss the average life expectancy in Europe during the
Renaissance. They produce different results ranging from thirty-five years to seventy-five years on
average depending on factors such as sex, wealth, social status, specific geographic area, and children
mortality (whether the average life expectancy was measured at birth, at age five, at age fifteen or later).
For this research, I assumed that in the 1500s the average life expectancy of inventors to be between sixty
and seventy years—considering that almost all the inventors were males and that in this case the life
expectancy must be measured at fifteen years or later. However, since an inventor could receive a patent
at almost any age, it becomes very difficult to estimate a “life” or a “life plus the life of the heirs” term.
Thus, I concluded that the previous analysis was preferable. For studies on life expectancy at different
points in history, see e.g., J P Griffin, Changing Life Expectancy Throughout History, 101 J. ROYAL
SOC’Y MED 577 (2008); Robert Finlay, The Venetian Republic as a Gerontocracy: Age and Politics in
the Renaissance, 8 J. MEDIEVAL & RENAISSANCE STUD. 157 (1978); Gilbert Creighton, When Did a
116
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CHART 1: DISTRIBUTION OF TERMS
It is noteworthy that of the 155 identified patents, fifty-two had a term
equal to the one requested by the applicant in his supplica; one had a longer
term than the one requested; and eighty-nine had shorter terms. No
information about the requested term was found for three patents, and in
ten cases, the applicant did not request a term of protection. Thus, it is
possible to say with confidence that the Senate granted a term different
than that requested by the inventor in 58% of the cases.
Consequently, the situation was clearly more complex in the context
of the assignment of the penalty. The analysis of the 155 identified patents
revealed that the Senate adopted a wide range of penalty levels. In 96% of
the cases, the penalty was a flat fee, but in six cases, the Senate assigned a
penalty based on the number of unauthorized copies of the invention found
at the time that the infringement was detected.119 Table 1 below reports the
list of penalties assigned to these latter six patents and the relevant
inventions.

Man in the Renaissance Grow Old?, 14 STUD. RENAISSANCE 7 (1967); S. Ryan Johansson, Medics,
Monarchs and Mortality, 1600-1800: Origins of the Knowledge-Driven Health Transition in Europe
(University of Oxford, Discussion Papers in Econ. & Soc. Hist., Paper No. 85, Oct. 2010),
https://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/history/Paper85/johansson85.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZH6-JZ3C].
119 For the purpose of the statistical analysis on the patent penalties described below, these patents
have been excluded from the dataset.
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TABLE 1. PATENTS WITH “PER ITEM” PENALTIES

Invention
Jar
Method to sow wheat
Method to work the fields
Mirror
Tools to grind (mill)
Machine to grind (mill)

Penalty
2 ducats per jar
5 ducats per field
10 ducats per field
25 ducats per mirror
50 ducats per mill
1,000 ducats per mill

The distribution of the “flat fee” penalties is reported in Chart 2,
Distribution of Penalties, which reveals that the three penalties the Senate
used most frequently were 300 ducats, 500 ducats, and 200 ducats,
assigned in 28%, 22%, and 19% of cases, respectively. Together, these
three penalty levels comprise 69% of the identified cases. The next most
frequent penalty was 100 ducats assigned in 12% of the cases; whereas, the
Senate assigned 1,000 ducats in three patents—the highest penalty
reported. Six patents were issued without penalty.120 Finally, in a few cases,
the Senate also used ten ducats, twenty-five ducats, fifty ducats, 150 ducats,
200 ducats and 600 ducats.

120 These patents were excluded from the dataset used for the statistical analysis of the patent
penalties.
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CHART 2: DISTRIBUTION OF PENALTIES
It is also interesting to consider the level of deference that the Senate
paid to the applicant’s request in the context of the penalties. In this regard,
an important finding is that the applicants appeared to have a significantly
lower interest in the assignment of the penalty than they did with the term.
In fact, in fifty out of 155 cases, the applicant did not even request a
specific penalty. On the other hand, the applicant failed to request a
specific term in only fourteen cases. As will be fully discussed in the next
subsection, a possible explanation for this result is that the function of the
penalty was primarily to cover the costs of policing infringements and
enforcing the patent.121 Moreover, the penalty collected in the case of
infringement had to be divided in equal amounts among three, sometimes
four different subjects, including the officer who carried out the destruction
of the unauthorized copy or copies of the invention, as well as the person
reporting the infringement.122 Consequently, compared to the term, the

121
122
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penalty must have appeared to be a much more indirect benefit for the
inventor who, in one-third of the cases, completely neglected to ask for it.123
In six cases, no information was found regarding the requested penalty. Of
the remaining ninety-nine patents, 37% had a penalty other than the one
requested by the applicant. Specifically, the Senate increased the penalty in
11% of the cases and reduced it in 26% of the cases. The remaining issue at
this point is to determine what the Senate wanted to achieve by exercising
its power to grant the term and penalty in patent law, which will be
discussed in detail in the next subsection.
C. Industry-based Patent Protection
In this part of the article, I explain that the Senate used the granting of
the term and the penalty to achieve somewhat different goals. The term was
clearly used to promote certain industries over others, whereas the penalty
was primarily designed to cover the costs engendered by the infringement
of the patent. I reached this conclusion by dividing the 155 identified
patents by the relevant industries of their inventions. The relevant
industries are: Agriculture, Construction, Energy, Food, Chemistry, Textile
and Water.124 Because twenty-two of the identified patents could not be
assigned to any of the aforementioned industries, I created an additional
category called “Other.” The patents included in the “Other” category
belong to the following industries: Entertainment, Musical Instruments,
Home Supply, and other Manufacturing.125

123

See infra Part II.C.
The Agriculture industry includes all the identified patents for inventions that pertained to
agriculture, such as a new method to make the fields fertile or a new machine to irrigate the fields. The
Construction industry includes all the identified patents for inventions that pertained to building, such as a
new machine to transport dirt and sand or a new instrument to heat limestone. The Energy industry
includes all the identified patents for inventions that pertained to the production of energy, such as a new
and more efficient mill or a new machine to grind (mill) without water. The Food industry includes all
the identified patents for inventions that pertained to food or food production, such as a new machine to sift
flour or a new machine to grind meat. The Chemistry industry includes all the identified patents for
inventions that pertained to chemicals (paintings, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, etc.), such as a new
pesticide for worms or a new facial oil. The Textile industry includes all the identified patents for
inventions related to textile production, such as a new method to print fabric with gold and silver and a
new frame to make silk. The Water industry includes all the identified patents for inventions pertaining
to management of water, the building of channels or the recovery of swamps, such as new machines or
methods to dig channels or a new pump to extract water from the soil.
125 For each of these latter industries, the number of assigned patents ranges from one to three.
Examples of the relevant inventions include: bedding for animals (other Manufacturing); a machine in
which people can see ninety-eight moving arts (Entertainment); and a harpsichord (Musical
Instruments).
124
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The main challenge I encountered in classifying the patents was that
in two cases, the grant was for multiple inventions, which could have been
assigned to different industries. Therefore, to avoid double counting, I
classified these two cases based on the industry of the invention in each
patent that had the highest economic value. The following, Chart 3,
Distribution of Patents by Industry, illustrates the distribution of the
identified patents by industry. It reveals that the two industries with the
highest number of patents were Water and Energy, 27% and 25%,
respectively; followed by Textile, 12%; the industries included in “Other,”
11% total; and Construction, 10%. The industries with the smallest number
of patents were Food, 6%; Agriculture, 5%; and Chemistry, also 4%.

CHART 3: DISTRIBUTION OF PATENTS BY INDUSTRY
The next step encompassed calculating the average number of years of
protection granted to inventions in different industries. Table 2 below
reveals that inventions in the Water and Energy industry received, on
average, five to seven additional years of protection compared to inventions
in other industries.
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TABLE 2. AVERAGE NUMBER OF YEARS OF PROTECTION BY INDUSTRY

Industry

Years
28.57
28.08
23.89
23.57
22.50
21.88
21.67
21.47

Water
Energy
Food
Agriculture
Chemistry
Construction
Textile
Other

The fact that inventions in the Water or Energy industries were
favored compared to other inventions is also evident when interpreting the
data in the Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 displays inventions that received the
longest terms in the twenty years considered. They are all inventions in the
Water and Energy industries.
TABLE 3. INVENTIONS WITH THE LONGEST TERMS 1560-1580

Invention
Machine to lift water
Methods to build wells
Inventions to dig channels
Dry mills
Machine to grind (mill)
Machine to lift water
Perpetual motion of water
Machine to dig channels
Machine to grind (mill) without water

Industry
Water
Water
Water
Energy
Energy
Water
Energy
Water
Energy

Term
40 years
50 years + citiz.
50 years
50 years
60 years
Life
Life + heirs
Life + heirs
Life + heirs

In contrast, Table 4 lists the inventions that received the shortest terms
during the twenty years considered. In this case, only two inventions
belong to the Energy industry, and there are no inventions from the Water
industry.
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TABLE 4. INVENTIONS WITH THE SHORTEST TERMS 1560-1580

Invention
Bedding (for animals)
Powder for worms
Grinder
Method to print fabric with gold and
silver
Machine in which people can see 98
moving arts
Windmills
Windows
Machine to lift heavy weights
Machine to grind rocks
Mills for silk

Industry
Other
Chemistry
Food
Textile

Years
10
10
10
10

Other

10

Energy
Construction
Construction
Construction
Energy

10
10
15
15
15

To determine if the Venetian Senate also used its power to assign a
penalty in order to promote certain industries over others, I calculated the
average penalty by industry. The results are summarized in Table 5.
Contrary to the term averages, the penalty averages present no statistically
significant industry-based differences. In fact, if we compare the term
industry averages with each other, it is possible to identify two distinct
groups: the Energy-Water group that received longer terms on the one
hand, and all the other industries on the other. Specifically, when either the
Energy or Water industry is compared with one of the other industries, the
difference of the term averages proves to be statistically significant with a
90% level of confidence.126 However, this result cannot be observed when
the other industries are compared. Similarly, this result cannot be observed
when the same statistical analysis is conducted with the penalty averages,
indicating that there is no relationship between the assignment of a specific
penalty and the industry of the invention.

126
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TABLE 5. AVERAGE PENALTY BY INDUSTRY

Industry

Food
Water
Other
Construction
Energy
Chemistry
Agriculture
Textile

Ducats
403.13
361.83
343.57
340.63
308.33
300.00
270.00
247.22

Finally, with respect to the grant of the term, I compared the
inventions with the highest assigned penalty to those with the lowest
penalty, but also in this case, no industry-based differences could be
identified. However, reading the identified patents helped to glean a
possible explanation for these penalty results. In fact, as mentioned briefly
above, the assigned penalty generally had to be divided in equal measure
among three, or sometimes four, different subjects. These subjects usually
were: the Pietà (a convent, orphanage, and music school in Venice); the
Arsenal, the accuser whose identity in many cases had to remain secret; the
applicant; and the magistrate in charge of executing the injunction to
destroy or confiscate the infringing copy of the invention.127 Illustrating this
point, in the case of Auger della Borda and Valentin Correr tedeschi128 the
Senate decided that:
[N]obody, aside from them, or those having a license or permission from
them, for 25 years, can use in any way . . . the new invention . . . under penalty
of losing the machines and of having to pay 1,000 ducats to be divided in
four shares, one for the Pietà, one for the Arsenal, one for the accuser,
[whose identity] must be kept secret, and one for the applicants or those
who will have authority from them.129

127 In some cases, the grant included an injunction to either destroy or confiscate the infringing
copy of the invention.
128 Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra, registro 43, carte 29 verso and 30 recto (files 99-100) (issued on
Dec. 11, 1560).
129 Id. (“[C]he niuno altro, che essi, ovvero chi haverà licentia, et libertà da loro possi per anni 25
usar quavis modo . . . il novo ingegno . . . sotto pena di perder gli edificij, et di pagar ducati 1,000 da
esser divisi in quattro parti una alla Pietà, una all’Arsenal, una all’accusator, il quale sia tenuto segreto,
et l’altraa loro supplicant o chi haverà causa da essi.”) (emphasis added).
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The case of Don Joao de Spinosa130 provides another useful example. Here,
the Senate provided that:
[F]or 25 years, nobody aside from [the applicant] or those having authority or
license from him can . . . use in any way [the invention] . . . under penalty of
losing the machine or machines, made by the infringer, that [at that point] will
belong to the applicant or those having authority from him and of having to
pay 400 ducats of which [100 ducats] will go to the accuser, [whose
identity] will remain secret, 100 [ducats] to the magistrate executing the
[the injunction], 100 [ducats] . . . to the Arsenal and 100 [ducats] to the
applicant.131

Finally, the case of Gerolamo Bembo132 represents an example of
when the penalty had to be divided among three subjects. Specifically, the
Senate’s grant said that:
[N]obody aside from the [applicant], or his heirs, or those having authority
from him . . . for the period of 30 years can make . . . the machine and
invention . . . under penalty of losing the machines, models and factories built
against this order, that will be immediately destroyed, and of paying 500
ducats one third belonging to the accuser, one third to the magistrate . . .
executing [this order and] one third to our Arsenal133

It is notable that in Bembo’s case, the Senate did not even assign a
portion of the penalty to the applicant. However, this must be considered to
have been a very unusual situation. Certainly, the function of the penalty
was also to compensate the patent holder, but this was not the primary
objective. Indeed, in the context of the penalty, the Senate had to ensure
that the amount granted, presumably based on the characteristics of the
specific invention,134 was sufficient not only to satisfy the inventors
themselves, but also to satisfy all the subjects involved in the infringement,
130

ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra, registro 43, carte 125 verso (files 291) (issued on Nov 25,

1561).
131 Id. (“[C]he per anni 25 alcun’altro che esso, o chi haverà causa, ovvero licentia da lui possa . . .
usar quovimodo l’ingegno . . . sotto pena . . . di perdere . . .l’edificio, ovvero edificij, che avessero fatti,
gli quali siano d’esso supplicante o de chi haverà causa da lui et di pagar ducati 400 de quali siano
dell’accustor, il quale sarà tenuto segreto, 100 del magistrate che farà l’esecuzione, cento applicati alla
casa dell’Arsenal, et 100 di esso supplicante, o de chi haverà causa da lui.”)(emphasis added).
132 ASV, Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra, registro 52, carte 179 recto (issued on June 6, 1579).
133 Id.(“[C]he altri che lui, o suoi heredi, o chi haverà causa da lui, non possa per lo spazio d’anni
30 prossimi fabicar . . . l’edificio et invention . . . sotto pena di perder li edificij, modelli, et fabriche
fatte contra il presente ordine, qulai siano subito rovinate, et di ducati 500 un terzo de quali sia
dell’accusator, un terzo di quell magistrato. . . che farà l’esecuzione, et l’atro terzo alla casa nostra
dell’ Arsenale.”)(emphasis added).
134 In this case, I am speculating regarding the possibility that the penalty would change if the
invention were, for example, difficult to destroy because of its size, was very valuable, or created a
heightened risk for those reporting the infringement.
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as well as guaranteeing a share for the Arsenal and charity. In other words,
this analysis illustrates that the Senate used its power to assign the penalty
to achieve substantially different goals than in the case of the grant of the
term, which was clearly industry driven. The next subsection briefly
analyzes possible reasons for the Senate to favor the Water and Energy
industries over others.
D. Possible explanations for favoring specific industries
The Venetian Senate used its customary patent system to provide
higher incentives for inventions in the Water and Energy industries. As
explained in the previous subsection, these industries received, on average,
five to six additional years of protection.135 Why did the Serenissima have
such a strong interest in the Water and Energy industries compared to other
industries, such as the Textile industry, which were also of great
importance to its economy?136 There are three possible reasons for this
result. The first and the most obvious relates to Venice’s location. Venice is
built on a lagoon; therefore, any invention that pertained to draining water,
digging channels, pumping water, and reclaiming swamps, must have been
of vital importance for the life of Venetian citizens in the 16th Century.
The second possible reason relates to the specific historical period
during the 16th century, in which these inventors sought patents at a time
concurrent with two significant events in Europe. First, the demographic
pressure became substantial; thereby, leading to the discovery of new ways
to produce more energy per capita, such as new machines (mills in
particular) that could produce energy at a lower cost, became essential.137
Second, deforestation had caused the price of wood to skyrocket.138 Thus,
finding alternative combustibles or more efficient machines, such as new
stoves or the use of olive pomace rather than wood, were very important.
A final possible reason was the risk of failure associated with these
inventions, particularly, mills.139 Contemporaneous accounts report that the

135

See supra Part II.C.
Consider the fact that the range of patented inventions in the last half of the 15th century was very
wide and included, for example, recipes, chemical formulae for dyeing, furnaces, water pumps, mills,
fabrics, glass, ceramic, food, etc. See Molà, supra note 24.
137 For example, the goal of the patented water mills was often to produce more energy with the same
amount of water by increasing the rotation speed of the wheel. In Venice, numerous experiments were
conducted to develop a mill that could use tidal power. See Luca Molà, Energia e Brevetti per Invenzioni
nell’Italia del Rinascimento, in ECONOMIA ENERGIA, SECC. XIII-XVIII, 981-91 (Florence, Le
Monnier, 2003).
138 Id.
139 Id.
136
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success rate of the patented mills was quite low.140 Specifically, they point
to the cost of operating the new mills, which often turned out to be higher
than the expected savings as well as the existence of certain structural
limitations, which could not have been foreseen at the time the patent
application was examined.141 Moreover, by the end of the 16th century, the
basic mill technology was well known, and many of these new inventions
were the result of significant experimentation attempting to improve that
technology.142 Ultimately, it could have been the case that workable
improvements for such a well-developed technology were harder to
develop. In conclusion, the higher risk of failure, combined with the unique
challenges of the time and location, engendered the need to promote the
Water and Energy industry over other industries. The remaining issue,
which will be discussed in the next section, is whether we can use what we
have learned about the tailoring activity in the patent law of the Venetian
Republic to inform the way in which we promote innovation and patent
quality today.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY PATENT PROTECTION
The Venetian Republic’s patent system seems to have produced a
number of positive results. For example, historians have reported that
because of its patent law, Venice transformed itself into a nation of artisans
and engineers and became the center of technological development in 16th
Century Europe.143 Moreover, they noted that contemporaneous
governments adopted the Venetian patent system as a model for their own
countries; thus, they contributed to the creation of an international market
for inventions, in which companies were formed to acquire patents in
different states.144 These patents were used to either develop related
products or to profit from their transfer to other subjects.145 In turn, this
process allowed for the dissemination of new technologies throughout
Europe.146 Therefore, given these outcomes, what can be learned from the
Venetian experience that could be used to inform our decisions in patent
law today?

140

Id.
Id.
142 Id.
143 Molà, supra note 24; LANE, supra note 38.
144 In fact, at that time, patents came to be considered commodities like any other. See Molà, supra
note 24.
145 Id.
146 Id.
141
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As highlighted in the Introduction, in 2003, Dan Burk and Mark
Lemley explained that “there is no reason to assume that a unitary patent
system [like the current one] optimally encourages innovation in the wide
range of diverse industries,”147 because there are significant structural
differences in how industries innovate.148 Consequently, patent protection
should be tailored to reflect such differences.149 Specifically, Burk and
Lemley suggested that courts should use the flexible standards present in
patent law to protect the needs of the various industries.150 However, they
also argue that other solutions might be available and, specifically,
suggested that administrative agencies, such as the USPTO, could achieve
the same result.151
This paper describes a historical example in which the tailoring
activity in patent law was conducted by the issuing authority—the Venetian
Senate—thereby providing an opportunity to re-examine the relevance of
the issuing authority’s role within the U.S. patent system and to consider
whether this role could be redesigned to provide optimal levels of
incentives to different industries. The relevant literature with respect to the
current role of the USPTO underlines a striking difference between this
agency and other administrative agencies, such as the EPA, the SEC, or the
OSHA.152 In fact, contrary to these other entities, the USPTO does not have
general regulatory authority and enjoys very limited ability to influence
policies in patent law.153 This is especially surprising considering the
significant technical aspect that characterizes patent law and the need to use
highly specialized information to answer many questions in this area.154 The
result is that patent law is virtually the only technical field of law in which
the knowledge accumulated by its administrative agency through years of
experience is not used to improve the effectiveness of the system. In
147

Burk & Lemley, supra note 1.
Id.
149 Id at 1577.
150 Id. at 1578-79 (Supreme Court precedent provides courts the freedom needed to adapt to
different innovations in differing industries).
151 Id. at 1696.
152 See Masur, supra note 6, at 302-04.
153 Id. at 303.
154 Masur criticized courts’ past decisions in patent law. Id. at 278-79 (“In areas of regulation
ranging from securities, to pharmaceutical drugs, to transportation, to the environment, policymakers
have turned [] to expert administrative agencies, perhaps because they understood the institutional
deficiencies of courts. This general trend toward agency policymaking in technical fields comes with
good reason. Absent input from an agency or the legislature, the federal courts have repeatedly proved
inadequate to the task of setting sound patent policy. Yet the institutional design for patent law remains
an outlier. Patent law is a highly technically complex regulatory field controlled entirely by the courts.
Similarly, the PTO is one of the only federal administrative agencies to lack any semblance of
substantive rulemaking authority.”).
148
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particular, the USPTO information is not used to make the patent system
more responsive to the specific characteristics and needs of the industries,
and the subjects operating within them, namely the inventors.
This is even more surprising if we consider the fact that the Venetian
patent system after which—to various degrees—virtually all the major
modern patent systems in the world have been modeled, operated in a
completely different way. In that context, the knowledge acquired by the
issuing authority through the reviewing process was the fundamental basis
for both the decision to grant the patent, assuming that the examination
showed that specific requirements were present, and the tailoring
activity.155 Thus, the gathering of all the relevant information about the
invention was scrupulously pursued by the Senate’s executive departments
that were assigned to review the patent applications.156 Importantly, to
accomplish this task, the reviewing departments often requested the
assistance of interested subjects such as the guilds—the industries of that
time, or the other executive departments relevant for the subject covered by
the invention.157 That is, it was not uncommon for the examiners to discuss
the nature of the invention, its novelty, and whether the invention would
cause any harm to the community or to the reputation of the Venetian
products with the guilds or other interested entities. For example, in the
case of Zorzi Pasqualigo, the invention was a new silk dye, and the
Proveditori di Commun were assigned to its examination. In their opinion,
the Proveditori reported that, “in order to produce a sound answer” on the
whether the invention was novel and would have benefited the Republic,
they asked both the silk merchants and the dyers to see and evaluate the
invention.158 Another example is the case of Zuan Maria Terzo, where the
invention was a new tool used in silk production—”a tool to wrap and
channel silk [threads].”159 The assigned reviewing department was the
Cinque Savi alla Mercantia, the Venetian department in charge of
Commerce.160 However, since the invention involved the silk industry, the
155

See supra Part I.C.
Id.
157 Id.
158 Zorzi Pasqualigo, ASV, Provveditori di Comun, Scritture, busta 5, registro 2 (issued on Apr. 1,
1569) (“[V]olendo fare la debita risposta habbiamo prima fatto intervenire li soprintendenti delli
mercanti della seda, quali vedute le mostre delli colori apresentate per detto supplicante han detto
essere vagi, et belli et che quando . . . Ne’ contesti di ciò habbiamo anco voluto udire li tentori sopra
questa materia . . . .”).
159 Zuan Maria Terzo, Cinque Savi alla Mercantia, Prima Serie, Risposte, 139 (It.) (“[T]rattandosi
dell’arte della seda tanto importante a questa Città habbiamo fatto venir all’officio nostro li
Proveditori di essa arte, et li habbiamo fatto vedere la presente supplicatione affine che ne
informassero de alcun contrario che potesse apportar ad essa arte questa nova invenzione . . . .”).
160 Id.; see supra Part I.C.
156
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Cinque Savi requested the opinion of the Proveditori alla Seta, the
representatives of the silk administrative department, about whether the
invention would create any harm to the Venetian silk industry.
The benefit of these interchanges was clearly the fact that the issuing
authority had a full understanding of the prior art and of the mechanisms of
the various industries and their needs. As we have seen, the information
gathered by the reviewing departments was incorporated into their opinions
and passed on by the Minor Consiglio to the Senate, which had the
exclusive authority to decide about the grant and tailoring of protection in
the specific case.161 Ultimately, it is reasonable to presume that this
examination of the inventions performed in close connection with all
subjects that had the highest understanding of the relative technical field,
including the guilds, not only facilitated the tailoring of patent protection,
but possibly resulted in the higher quality of the issued patents. As
mentioned, increasing patent quality and tailoring patent protection have
been central issues in significant research and debates in recent years. Thus,
naturally the question becomes whether it would be possible for the modern
patent office to achieve the same results that the Venetian Senate produced
working together with all the other subjects involved in the review of
patents at that time. What might be associated with such activity?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to consider the two
strongest arguments found in the relevant literature against awarding rulemaking authority to the USPTO. They refer to: 1) the USPTO past
performance, and 2) the USPTO capture.162
The first objection alludes to the fact that, if we consider the way in
which the USPTO has been carrying out its current task of reviewing patent
applications, we must conclude that this entity should not be entrusted with
rule-making authority like other administrative agencies because many
have considered its performance to be suboptimal. However, scholars have
quickly dismissed this issue by explaining that the USPTO performance,
like the performance of any other entity, is dependent on its funding and
that the UPSTO “operates under conditions of limited resources.”163
161

See supra Part I.C.
In addition to the PTO experience and the PTO capture, Masur identifies four other possible
explanations for Congress failing to delegate rule-making authority to the PTO. Ultimately, he
concludes that path dependence—Congress’ adherence to prior practice due to historical accident, is the
most likely explanation. The other explanations are: rent-seeking—Congress’s desire to continue
collecting rents from interest groups; property rights—Congress’s belief that the patent systems
shouldn’t be governed by rules created by an administrative agency, because patents are property rights;
statutory vagueness—Congress’s fear that the PTO will take undue liberties given the lack of
specificity of the Patent Act. See Masur, supra note 6, at 296-04.
163 Id. at 300.
162
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Consequently, improving the USPTO performance would probably be
sufficient to allocate more money to it.164 A full analysis of this point is
beyond the scope of this paper, because very little can be learned from the
Venetian experience in terms of the resources employed by the issuing
authority to conduct its activity. As described above, the reviewing of the
patent applications in Venice was very thorough and involved multiple
subjects; thus, it must have required substantial resources.165 However, in
the absence of detailed information in the original documents about the cost
associated with providing patent protection at that time, no other
conclusion can be made on this issue. Having said that, it appears
straightforward that allocating more funding to an agency, such as the
USPTO, would be beneficial because, at the minimum, it would allow this
entity to hire better, more qualified employees, which is very likely to
translate into improved performance.
The second objection to the USPTO acquiring general regulatory
authority and being the entity that provides tailored patent protection is
more complex and refers to the possibility that this agency will be captured
by private interests.166 However, as has been emphasized, this argument
does not explain why other administrative agencies have been awarded
more regulatory power. In fact, nothing seems to differentiate the USPTO
in terms of agency capture that could justify the discrepancy in the rulemaking authority granted by Congress to other entities.167
From a different perspective, scholars have also explained that courts
are generally considered to be less subject to the capture problem.168 Thus,
the Federal Circuit is considered a much better alternative to the USPTO to
create policies in patent law.169 However, other scholars have contradicted
this argument. They explained that external influences extend to courts as
well, and “that the Federal Circuit itself may have been captured by private
interests.”170
In the context of the Venetian example, the problem of agency capture
would have resulted in the guilds being able to exercise too much power
over the Senate on decisions relating to patent law. However, as we have
seen, the Venetian case reveals that rather than being a problem, the close
164

See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.
166 See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 6, at 106-07; Long, supra note 19, at 1969; Meurer,
supra note 19, at 686.
167 Masur, supra note 6, at 313 (“. . . the PTO fares no worse than the typical administrative
agency.”).
168 Id. at 301-02.
169 Tran, supra note 6, at 491.
170 Masur, supra note 6, at 313.
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relationship between the issuing authority and the industries was a positive
factor.171 In other words, as previously suggested by Sarah Tran, the
Venetian case seems to indicate that industry lobbying could become an
element that helps the system rather than harms it.172 That is, if structured
correctly, the interaction with the interest groups fosters an otherwise
unlikely use of important information. In Venice, this was made possible
by the presence of a system in which the information gathered by the
examiners was certain to reach the decision maker—the Senate. At that
time, there was no disconnect between those who had the information, the
examining departments, and those who needed to use that information to
make important decisions in patent law—the Senate.173 Nevertheless, “no
disconnect” did not mean the absence of control or review of that
information. As described above, very often the examination of the
invention was assigned to multiple executive departments working with
different guilds.174
Moreover, the Proveditori di Commun, an agency of general
competence, was almost always involved in the reviewing process together
with other specialized departments. As a result, multiple inputs contributed
to form the full picture on which the Senate conducted its work.
Furthermore, while it is true that the subjects acquiring the information, the
reviewing departments, and the subject ultimately making the decisions, the
Senate, operated “under the same roof,” some distance was built among the
various subjects involved in examining the patent applications. As
described above, the information gathered by the administrative
departments was incorporated into their opinions.175 The Minor Consiglio
collected these opinions and presented the application to the Senate.176
Thus, a few “steps” separated the guilds and the Senate. Ultimately, even if
it appears unlikely that the Senate operated completely independently of
interest groups, it would have been very difficult for a single guild to
exercise much power over the Senate’s decision- making in patent law. At
the same time, it is through this system that the Venetian Republic achieved
its goal of granting tailored patent protection and high-quality patents for
more than 300 years.

171
172
173
174
175
176

See supra Part I.C.
Tran, supra note 6, at 526-27.
Masur, supra note 6, at 315, 325.
See supra Part I.C.
Id.
Id.
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In conclusion, the lessons provided by the Venetian experience,
combined with the fact that any external influence by interest groups might
extend to entities other than administrative agencies, seem to indicate that
some degree of agency capture in relation to the activity of the issuing
authority might be acceptable. In other words, some degree of industry
capture might be considered tolerable if it represents the price that we have
to pay for a better-informed patent system that provides the correct
incentives to inventors in different industries and produces higher quality
patents than those currently issued.
CONCLUSIONS
In 2003, Burk and Lemley demonstrated that patent protection should
be tailored to the characteristics of different industries. Prior to this
research, other scholars argued in favor of tailored patent protection.
However, only after Burk and Lemley’s article did significant debate
emerge on the tailoring of patent protection, and related to that, increasing
patent quality. The most significant source of disagreement in this context
revolves around the entity that should be entrusted with the authority to
provide tailored patent protection—the Federal Circuit or the USPTO. This
paper reveals that historically, the tailoring of patent protection had been
provided by the Venetian Republic for over 300 years. In that case, the
issuing authority—the Senate—granted tailored protection in each case.
Using original documents from the Venice State Archive, this paper
reveals that between the 15th and 18th centuries, the Venetian Republic
provided patent protection based on the characteristics of the invention as
well as its industry. In particular, toward the end of the 16th century, it
granted a higher level of protection to inventions in the Water and Energy
industry compared to inventions in other industries.
The Venetian Republic achieved the goal of promoting specific
industries over others through its customary patent system, which allowed
the Senate to grant different terms and penalties to different inventions.
Specifically, between 1560 and 1580, the Senate granted, on average, five
to seven additional years of protection to inventions in the Water and
Energy industry compared to others. On the other hand, the grant of the
penalties was used to cover the costs of possible infringements.
Therefore, what can we learn from the Venetian experience that could
inform the modern debate on patent law? As mentioned, the tailoring and
reviewing activities in Venice were conducted by the issuing authority.
Consequently, this study represents an opportunity to re-evaluate the
relevance of the issuing authority’s role within our patent system. It
provides a rationale for considering the specific changes that should be
340
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made to increase the USPTO’s regulatory authority and begin investigating
if our patent office’s role could be redesigned to optimize the level of
incentives provided to different industries.
In the literature, the two most significant objections to an increased
role of the USPTO within the patent system and, in particular, to vest this
entity with general regulatory authority that could be used to provide
tailored patent protection, are past performance and the risk of agency
capture. As emphasized by other scholars, this paper argues that the
USPTO’s past performance could be significantly improved with better
funding.177 Moreover, it presents the Venetian case to show that,
historically, the agency capture problem has been managed and that the
close interaction with the industries has been used to benefit the system
rather than to harm it. In Venice, the Senate and its executive departments
used the interaction with the guilds to improve the way in which tailored
protection was provided; they used the guilds’ knowledge to their
advantage. Ultimately, it is reasonable to believe that this better-informed
system not only provided better incentives to the inventors, but also
resulted in very high-quality patents.
In conclusion, additional research is necessary to fully determine how
the Venetian example can be used to improve the current system. However,
this paper presents a very strong case favoring a more significant role of the
USPTO within the patent system in view of the relevant experience and
specialized knowledge that was well understood in the Venetian Republic
to facilitate the Republic’s efficient and effective administration of patent
rights. Moreover, in other areas, Congress has chosen to entrust
administrative agencies with substantial rule- making authority. It is now
time for the same result to be achieved in patent law as well.
APPENDIX
The conclusion discussed in Part II.C is the result of a statistical
hypothesis test carried out according to the following steps:
Null and alternative hypotheses. For each pair of industries (namely,
population 1 and population 2), a null (HO) and alternative (H1) hypotheses
were stated as follows: The null hypothesis, which is a contradiction of the
result to be proved, was that the two industries had the same mean. The
alternative hypothesis was that the two industries had different means.
Test statistic. The test statistic for the difference of two population means is:

177

Masur, supra note 6, at 300.
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where:
x1: sample mean of population 1
x2: sample mean of population 2
µ1: mean of population 1
µ2: mean of population 2
a-1: sample standard deviation of population 1 a-2: sample standard deviation
of population 2 n1: sample size of population 1
n2: sample size of population 2
The test statistic, t, is assumed to have a student’s t probability distribution
function with a number of degrees of freedom, df, given by:

Significance level. The significance level was chosen at 90% (a = 0.1) in order
to define the probability threshold (p-value).
Results. The null hypothesis was rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis
according to the following tables.

Main case
In the main case the patent granted to Fedele Piccolomini was
excluded from the dataset.
Terms:
Average
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

23.57
21.88
22.50
28.08
23.89
21.47
21.67
28.57

Standard
deviation
5.56
5.12
7.58
13.16
6.01
7.02
4.20
13.54

Count

Percentage
7
16
6
39
9
17
18
42

4.54%
10.39%
3.90%
25.32%
5.84%
11.04%
11.69%
27.27%

Table 1. Averages and standard deviations.
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Water
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Construction
0.69

-0.69
-0.29
1.51
0.11
-0.78
-0.82
1.70

Chemistry
-1.51
-0.19

0.19
2.51
0.85
-0.19
-0.13
2.76

Energy

Food

Other

-1.51
-2.51
-1.49

1.49
0.38
-0.29
-0.26
1.63

-0.11
-0.85
-0.38
1.44

-1.44
-2.44
-2.75
0.17

Textile
0.78
0.19
0.29
2.44
0.92

-0.92
-0.99
1.63

Water
0.82
0.13
0.26
2.75
0.99
-0.10

0.10
2.65

-1.70
-2.76
-1.63
-0.17
-1.63
-2.65
-3.02

3.02

Table 2. Test statistic values.
Agriculture
Water
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

Construction
Energy
1.35

-1.35
-1.36
1.32
1.34
-1.34
-1.37
1.32

Chemistry
Food
1.36
-1.39

1.39
1.30
1.34
-1.31
-1.31
1.30

Energy
Agriculture
-1.32
-1.30
-1.35

1.35
1.36
-1.37
-1.41
1.36

Food
Chemistry
-1.34
-1.34
-1.36
1.31

-1.31
-1.30
-1.30
1.29

Other
Construction
1.34
1.31
1.37
1.30
1.32

-1.32
-1.35
1.31

Textile
Textile

Water
Other
1.37
1.31
1.41
1.30
1.35
-1.31

-1.31
1.30

-1.32
-1.30
-1.36
-1.29
-1.31
-1.30
-1.30

1.30

Table 3. p-values.
Agriculture
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

0
0
1
0
0
0
1

Construction
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

Chemistry
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

Energy
1
1
1
1
1
1
0

Food

Other
0
0
0
1
0
0
1

0
0
0
1
0

Textile
0
0
0
1
0
0

0
1

1

Table 4. Test results: 1 means to reject the null hypothesis; 0 fails to reject
the null hypothesis.
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Penalties:
Average
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

270.00
340.63
300.00
308.33
403.13
343.57
247.22
361.83

Standard
deviation
164.32
285.90
234.52
138.10
316.35
239.80
121.84
236.54

Count

Percentage
7
16
6
39
9
17
18
42

4.54%
10.39%
3.90%
25.32%
5.84%
11.04%
11.69%
27.27%

Table 5. Averages and standard deviations.
Food

Water

Food
Water
Other
Construction
Energy
Chemistry
Agriculture
Textile

Other
-0.75

0.75
0.26
0.58
1.09
0.86
-0.33
1.28

-0.26
0.34

-0.34
-0.43
0.49
0.03
-1.21
0.26

Construction
-0.58
0.43
-0.08

0.08
0.72
0.39
-0.53
0.60

Energy
-1.09
-0.49
-0.72
-0.88

0.88
0.57
-1.69
1.26

Chemistry
-0.86
-0.03
-0.39
-0.57
0.49

-0.49
-1.43
-0.37

Agriculture
0.33
1.21
0.53
1.69
1.43
1.49

-1.49
0.27

Textile
-1.28
-0.26
-0.60
-1.26
0.37
-0.27
-2.49

2.49

Table 6. Test statistic values.
Agriculture
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

1.32
1.37
1.38
1.34
1.33
-1.37
1.35

Construction
-1.32
-1.35
-1.33
1.33
1.31
-1.32
1.32

Chemistry
-1.37
1.35
1.42
1.34
1.37
-1.41
1.40

Energy
-1.38
1.33
-1.42

Food
-1.34
-1.33
-1.34
-1.37

1.37
1.32
-1.30
1.29

1.34
-1.37
1.36

Other
-1.33
-1.31
-1.37
-1.32
1.34

Textile
1.37
1.32
1.41
1.30
1.37
1.32

-1.32
1.31

1.30

Chemistry
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0

Agriculture
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1

Water
-1.35
-1.32
-1.40
-1.29
1.36
-1.31
-1.30

Table 7. p-values.
Food
Food
Water
Other
Construction
Energy
Chemistry
Agriculture
Textile

Water
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Other
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Construction
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0

Energy
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

Table 8. Test results: 1 means to reject the null hypothesis; 0 fails to
reject the null hypothesis.
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Piccolomini ten year case
In the Piccolomini ten year case the patent granted to Fedele
Piccolomini was assigned a term of ten years.
Terms:
Average
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

23.57
21.88
22.50
28.08
23.89
21.47
21.67
28.14

Standard
deviation
5.56
5.12
7.58
13.16
6.01
7.02
4.20
13.67

Count

Percentage
7
16
6
39
9
17
18
43

4.52%
10.32%
3.87%
25.16%
5.81%
10.97%
11.61%
27.74%

Table 9. Averages and standard deviations.
Agriculture
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

-0.69
-0.29
1.51
0.11
-0.78
-0.82
1.54

Construction
0.69
0.19
2.51
0.85
-0.19
-0.13
2.56

Chemistry
-1.51
-0.19
1.49
0.38
-0.29
-0.26
1.51

Energy

Food
-1.51
-2.51
-1.49

Other
-0.11
-0.85
-0.38
1.44

-1.44
-2.44
-2.75
0.02

-0.92
-0.99
1.47

Textile
0.78
0.19
0.29
2.44
0.92

Water
0.82
0.13
0.26
2.75
0.99
-0.10

0.10
2.48

-1.54
-2.56
-1.51
-0.02
-1.47
-2.48
-2.80

2.80

Table 10. Test statistic values.
Agriculture
Water
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

-1.35
-1.36
1.32
1.34
-1.34
-1.37
1.32

Construction
Energy
1.35
1.39
1.30
1.34
-1.31
-1.31
1.30

Chemistry
Food
1.36
-1.39
1.35
1.36
-1.37
-1.41
1.35

Energy
Agriculture
-1.32
-1.30
-1.35

Food
Chemistry
-1.34
-1.34
-1.36
1.31

-1.31
-1.30
-1.30
1.29

-1.32
-1.35
1.31

Other
Construction
1.34
1.31
1.37
1.30
1.32

Textile
Textile

Water
Other
1.37
1.31
1.41
1.30
1.35
-1.31

-1.31
1.30

1.30

Table 11. p-values.

345

-1.32
-1.30
-1.35
-1.29
-1.31
-1.30
-1.30
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Agriculture
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

0
0
1
0
0
0
1

Construction
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

Chemistry
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

Energy
1
1
1

Food

Other
0
0
0
1

1
1
1
0

Textile
0
0
0
1
0
0

0
0
0
1
0

0
0
1

0
1

Water
1
1
1
0
1
1
1

1

Table 12. Test results: 1 means to reject the null hypothesis; 0 fails to
reject the null hypothesis.
Piccolomini sixty year case
In the Piccolomini sixty year case the patent granted to Fedele
Piccolomini was assigned a term of sixty years.
Terms:
Average
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

23.57
21.88
22.50
28.08
23.89
21.47
21.67
29.30

Standard
deviation
5.56
5.12
7.58
13.16
6.01
7.02
4.20
14.21

Count

Percentage
7
16
6
39
9
17
18
43

4.52%
10.32%
3.87%
25.16%
5.81%
10.97%
11.61%
27.74%

Table 13. Averages and standard deviations.
Agriculture
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

-0.69
-0.29
1.51
0.11
-0.78
-0.82
1.90

Construction
0.69
0.19
2.51
0.85
-0.19
-0.13
2.95

Chemistry
-1.51
-0.19
1.49
0.38
-0.29
-0.26
1.80

Energy

Food
-1.51
-2.51
-1.49
-1.44
-2.44
-2.75
0.41

Other
-0.11
-0.85
-0.38
1.44
-0.92
-0.99
1.83

Table 14. Test statistic values.

346

Textile
0.78
0.19
0.29
2.44
0.92
0.10
2.84

Water
0.82
0.13
0.26
2.75
0.99
-0.10
3.21

-1.90
-2.95
-1.80
-0.41
-1.83
-2.84
-3.21

17:301 (2020)

Agriculture
Water
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

Lessons from the Past

Construction
Energy
1.35

-1.35
-1.36
1.32
1.34
-1.34
-1.37
1.32

Chemistry
Food
1.36
-1.39

1.39
1.30
1.34
-1.31
-1.31
1.30

Energy
Agriculture
-1.32
-1.30
-1.35

1.35
1.36
-1.37
-1.41
1.35

Food
Chemistry
-1.34
-1.34
-1.36
1.31

-1.31
-1.30
-1.30
1.29

Other
Construction
1.34
1.31
1.37
1.30
1.32

-1.32
-1.35
1.31

Textile
Textile

Water
Other
1.37
1.31
1.41
1.30
1.35
-1.31

-1.31
1.30

-1.32
-1.30
-1.35
-1.29
-1.31
-1.30
-1.30

1.30

Table 15. p-values.
Agriculture
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

0
0
1
0
0
0
1

Construction
0

0
1
0
0
0
1

Chemistry
0
0

1
0
0
0
1

Energy
1
1
1

Food

Other

0
0
0
1

1
1
1
0

0
0
0
1
0

0
0
0

Textile
0
0
0
1
0
0

0
0

0

Table 16. Test results: 1 means to reject the null hypothesis; 0 fails to
reject the null hypothesis.
Piccolomini eighty year case
In the Piccolomini eighty year case the patent granted to Fedele
Piccolomini was assigned a term of eighty years.
Terms:
Average
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

23.57
21.88
22.50
28.08
23.89
21.47
21.67
29.76

Standard
deviation
5.56
5.12
7.58
13.16
6.01
7.02
4.20
15.50

Count

Percentage
7
16
6
39
9
17
18
43

4.52%
10.32%
3.87%
25.16%
5.81%
10.97%
11.61%
27.74%

Table 17. Averages and standard deviations.
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Water

1
1
1
0
1
1
1
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Agriculture
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

Construction
0.69

-0.69
-0.29
1.51
0.11
-0.78
-0.82
1.96

Chemistry
-1.51
-0.19

0.19
2.51
0.85
-0.19
-0.13
2.93

Energy

Food

Other

-1.51
-2.51
-1.49

1.49
0.38
-0.29
-0.26
1.87

Textile

-0.11
-0.85
-0.38
1.44

-1.44
-2.44
-2.75
0.53

0.78
0.19
0.29
2.44
0.92

-0.92
-0.99
1.90

Water
0.82
0.13
0.26
2.75
0.99
-0.10

0.10
2.85

-1.96
-2.93
-1.87
-0.53
-1.90
-2.85
-3.16

3.16

Table 18. Test statistic values.
Agriculture
Water
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

Construction
Energy
1.35

-1.35
-1.36
1.32
1.34
-1.34
-1.37
1.31

Chemistry
Food
1.36
-1.39

1.39
1.30
1.34
-1.31
-1.31
1.30

Energy
Agriculture
-1.32
-1.30
-1.35

1.35
1.36
-1.37
-1.41
1.34

Food
Chemistry
-1.34
-1.34
-1.36
1.31

-1.31
-1.30
-1.30
1.29

Other
Construction
1.34
1.31
1.37
1.30
1.32

-1.32
-1.35
1.31

Textile
Textile

Water
Other
1.37
1.31
1.41
1.30
1.35
-1.31

-1.31
1.30

-1.31
-1.30
-1.34
-1.29
-1.31
-1.30
-1.30

1.30

Table 19. p-values.
Agriculture
Agriculture
Construction
Chemistry
Energy
Food
Other
Textiles
Water

0
0
1
0
0
0
1

Construction
0

0
1
0
0
0
1

Chemistry
0
0

1
0
0
0
1

Energy
1
1
1

1
1
1
0

Food

Other

0
0
0
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
1
0

Textile
0
0
0
1
0
0

0
0

Table 20. Test results: 1 means to reject the null hypothesis; 0 fails to
reject the null hypothesis.
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0

Water

1
1
1
0
1
1
1

